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Abstract 
The King Reports, as well as legislative developments culminating from these 
reports, are aimed at enhancing corporate governance standards in South 
Africa and aligning them with international best practice. Notwithstanding 
these measures, a number of significant failures in corporate governance 
rocked South African business during this period, severely denting the 
perception of the quality and standard of corporate governance. 
Given the importance of international investors' confidence, a continuous 
review of the South African corporate governance structure is imperative. 
This dissertation aims at performing a comparative and critical analysis of the 
corporate governance structures in South Africa. The objective is to seek 
alternative or improved corporate governance mechanisms that will enhance 
the current dispensation. For this purpose, various international corporate 
governance models are analysed and their monitoring mechanisms identified. 
The possibility of utilising some of these mechanisms to enhance corporate 
governance in South Africa is examined. 
The institutional environment in South Africa (I.e. the controlled shareholder 
environment, inactive and illiquid markets) prevents the market model 
mechanisms of the US and UK from playing a greater monitoring role. 
Further market model mechanisms aimed at promoting the independent 
monitoring of management have to a large extent been incorporated into the 
South African corporate governance framework. However, the ongoing 
failures of large listed and unlisted companies, including smaller banks in 
South Africa, that appear to indicate poor levels of, or ineffective, corporate 
governance, calls for the enforcement and acceptance of the monitoring 
guidelines set out in the King Reports. 
The German and Japanese bank governance model has a limited application 
in South Africa. The level of bank debt financing is generally lower than 
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equity financing, thereby restricting banks' ability to become monitors through 
their debt control rights. 
Even though regulatory reform in South Africa has supported transformation 
into a market model dispensation, the continued existence of an institutional 
framework that fails to support total reform to the market model, remains a 
reality that must be addressed. As South Africa features a strong institutional 
shareholder environment, it is proposed that institutional investors should play 
a more significant monitoring role in corporate governance, by becoming 
active shareholders and by assuming the ownership responsibilities inherent 
in the shares under their control. 
ix 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Background: 
The focus on corporate governance in South Africa has increased over the 
last decade. Corporate governance was institutionalised by the publication of 
the King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa (King Report) in 
1994 that aimed to promote higher standards of corporate governance in 
South Africa. Local and international developments following South Africa's 
democratic elections in 1994, were subsequently incorporated in the second 
King Report, published in 2002. These reports culminated in legislative 
developments aimed at enhancing corporate governance standards in South 
Africa and aligning them with international best practice. These include the 
~ 
1995 revision of the listing requirements of the JSE Securities Exchange in 
South Africa, which were again revised in 2000. Other legislation amended 
as a result of the 1994 King Report included the Companies Act (No. 61 of 
1973) and Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990) to enforce compliance with 
substantially higher standards of corporate governance compliance. 
Notwithstanding these measures, a number of significant failures in corporate 
governance rocked South African business during this period. Investors lost 
large amounts of money due to mismanagement and the alleged wrong doing 
by the directors of Leisurenet, Regal Treasury Bank, Unifer and Saambou 
Bank 1• Common features of these cases include inadequate levels of 
disclosure to stakeholders, as well as a lack of the necessary controls to 
prevent mismanagement and the abuse of power. These failures have 
severely dented the perception of the quality and standard of corporate 
governance in South Africa. 
The recent published second King Report (2002) has made a significant 
contribution towards reforming corporate governance Within the corporate 
1 Source: www.news24.com (refer to section 7 for further reference) 
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environment. However, in itself it does not address the main focus of this 
thesis which is the broader international corporate governance mechanisms 
including market governance and monitoring by large institutions e.g. banks. 
The perceived quality of corporate governance in a country is important for 
attracting global capital. This means that in order to attract investment from 
significant international players, and as an emerging market, South Africa 
" must practice and maintain high standards of corporate governance. Failure 
to do so will cause capital to flow elsewhere. According to McKinsey's 
Investors Opinion Survey (McKinsey and Company, 2000), more than 84% of 
over 200 global institutional investors surveyed, indicated a willingness to pay 
a premiu m for shares in a well-governed company over one considered poorly 
. 
governed, but with comparable financial results. This survey therefore 
emphasises that investors' perceptions that a market is well governed can 
potentially add significant shareholder value. 
Problem statement: 
The problem to be addressed by this dissertation is the increasing occurrence 
of corporate governance failures in the South African economy, leading to 
declining levels of investors' confidence. 
Research objective: 
This dissertation aims at performing a comparative and critical analysis of the 
corporate governance structures in South Africa. The objective is to seek 
alternative or improved corporate governance mechanisms that will enhance 
the current dispensation. 
Research approach: 
This study performs a critical comparative analysis of international corporate 
governance models and their inherent monitoring mechanisms. This is 
followed by an evaluation of the extent to which these governance 
mechanisms exist in South Africa in the context of the unique circumstances 
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that influence the particular governance mechanisms suitable for South 
African conditions. Concluding from this evaluation, the incorporation of some 
of the international governance mechanisms into the existing governance 
framework is suggested with the aim at enhancing the level of corporate 
governance in South Africa. 
Thesis structure: 
This study commences with Chapter 2 by providing a general background to 
corporate governance, its objectives and explaining why it is relevant. In 
Chapter 3, certain international corporate governance models are analysed, 
with reference to market governance, bank governance as well as holding 
company governance. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the extent to which 
~ 
the previously discussed governance mechanisms exist in South Africa, as 
well as an evaluation of the potential to incorporate certain aspects of the 
monitoring mechanisms into the existing governance framework. Chapter 5 
suggests an alternative form of monitoring for South African corporations, i.e. 
monitoring by large institutional investors. 
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2. OBJECTIVES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Corporate governance defined 
The term, corporate governance, is often defined as the formal system of 
accountability by senior management to the shareholders. A more expansive 
definition includes the entire set of legal rules, relations and behaviours. that 
constitute the system by which a company is controlled and directed in a 
given society. 
The Cadbury Committee Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury Report) (1992) defines corporate governance as 
"the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. 
The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and the 
auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance 
structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting 
the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to 
shareholders on their stewardship. The board's actions are subject to 
laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting" 
(paragraph 2.5). 
The Cadbury Committee was set up, in the United Kingdom, specifically to 
consider the financial aspects of corporate governance. These aspects 
included the way boards set financial policy and oversee its implementation, 
the use of financial controls as well as the process whereby boards report to 
the shareholders on the activities and progress of the company (Cadbury 
Report, 1992). 
Subsequently, the Hampel committee was established in 1995 to review the 
recommendations of the Cad bury committee in respect of corporate 
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governance and noted that the Cadbury Committee's definition of corporate 
governance places the directors of the company at the centre of any decision 
on corporate governance. The report also links corporate governance to the 
role of the shareholders who must appoint the directors and concludes that 
the Cad bury Committee's definition· is restrictive because it excludes many 
activities involved in managing a company, which may be vital to the success 
of the business (Hampel Report, 1998). 
The Hampel Report (1998) further states that the overriding objective of listed 
companies is the preservation and greatest enhancement, over time, of their 
shareholders' investment. It also refers to the stakeholder view of corporate 
governance, that " ... a company must develop relationships relevant to its 
success. These will depend on the nature of the company's business; but 
they will include those with employees, customers, suppliers, credit providers, 
local communities and governments" (paragraph 1.16). This recognises that 
directors can pursue the objective of successfully enhancing shareholder 
value, in the long term, only by developing and sustaining the various 
stakeholder relationships. 
The King committee in South Africa supports the wider definition of corporate· 
governance and recognises the importance of corporate governance in 
addressing the needs of different stakeholders including shareholders, 
employees, bankers, suppliers, customers, environmentalists and the 
community (King Report, 1994). The second King Report (2002) expands on 
this inclusive approach by stating that a company's stakeholders need to be 
considered when developing the strategies to achieve the company's goals. It 
also stresses the importance of mutually beneficial relationships between the 
company and its stakeholders in creating sustained business success and 
long-term growth in shareholder value. 
From the various definitions, it can be deduced that corporate governance 
includes the systems and structures which govern the relationships between 
5 
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the management of a firm and its various stakeholders. This chapter will 
outline the objectives and relevance of inclusive governance in a corporate 
context. 
The stakeholder view of corporate governance incorporates a wide range of 
stakeholders that is affected by the rules and relationships that comprise a 
corporate governance system. The review of various corporate governance 
systems in Chapter 3 will, however, mainly focus on the systems that support 
one of these stakeholder relationships, namely, management (or controlling 
parties') accountability to shareholders. 
2.2 The objectives of corporate governance 
As outlined in the Cadbury Report (1992), the basic principle which underpins 
corporate governance in the UK, is that managers should be free to drive their 
companies forward, exercising that freedom within a framework of effective 
accountability. A framework of accountability provides the necessary checks 
and balances and is one that can facilitate action when a leader uses his/her 
power in an abusive or irresponsible manner. The committee's statement, 
however, recognises the important role of quality leadership by indicating that 
freedom of leadership style should be permitted. The successful turnaround· 
of a business, or the establishment of a company's long-term profitability, can 
often be attributed to exceptional leadership. On the other hand, numerous 
corporate failures can be the consequence of the extended reign of a powerful 
leader who is not supported by an effective system of essential checks and 
balances. A system promoting management accountability seems to be an 
essential component of an effective governance system. 
Following the first King Report (1994), the second King Report (2002) 
provides a useful summary of the objectives of corporate governance, 
including its seven primary characteristics, which can be summarised as 
follows: 
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• Discipline - senior management must adhere to recognised behaviour 
• Transparency - outsiders must be able to analyse a company's actions 
• Independence - potential conflicts of interest should be minimised 
• Accountability - individuals and groups must be held accountable for their 
decisions 
• Responsibility - the board must be responsible to all stakeholders 
• Fairness - companies must have balanced systems, taking in to account 
those who have an interest in the company 
• Social responsibility - companies must be aware of and respond to social 
issues 
In Chapter 3, the discussion on various corporate governance systems will 
include a review of the effectiveness of these systems in meeting these 
objectives, as reported in literature. 
2.3 The background to corporate governance 
The problem associated with corporate governance originated with the 
separation of joint ownership and control of the stock in a company. This 
separation can lead to a deviation from the goal of maximizing shareholder 
value because the controlling powers (executive management) could value 
their own well-being above that of the owners (shareholders) of the business. 
The potential misappropriation of the firm's funds, or abuse of power by 
management, creates need for ongoing reform in corporate governance. 
However, there seems to be little consensus as to how far reaching corporate 
governance arrangements should extend. The vastly differing corporate 
governance models outlined below, reflect the 'both narrow and broad 
definitions of corporate governance provided in section 2.1. 
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The principal-agent model 
The principal-agent model assumes that markets provide the most effective 
restraints on managerial behaviour. Shareholders are viewed as the owners 
of the corporation' and by exercising their voting rights, they should commit 
corporate resources to optimiSing shareholder value (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 3l. 
It contends that external intervention, for example, costs incurred in aligning 
managerial behaviour with the shareholders' interests, represent distortions of 
effective market systems and should therefore be eliminated or minimized. 
Initiatives like executive stock options, or leveraged management buy-outs, 
will occur spontaneously if they are viewed as improvements to the current 
system. It is argued that improvements in corporate governance will be 
. 
implemented without compulsion when they will increase a company's 
profitability and, therefore, also its value. 
As previously noted, the separation of ownership and control may allow 
managers to deviate from the value-maximizing objective. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the cost of such behaviour is already discounted 
in the equity value when an owner-manager sells stakes to outsiders. The 
fact that owner-managers sell equity in this manner, indicates that the benefits 
of having a professional management function outweigh the cost of the 
separation of ownership and control. This relationship, or contract, between 
management (board of directors) and the owners (shareholders), leaves no 
room on the corporate board for any additional obligations to other 
stakeholders. 
The principal-agent model echoes the narrow. definition of corporate 
governance, namely the formal system of accountability of management to 
shareholders. 
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The stakeholder model 
The stakeholder model expands the definition of a firm's objective beyond 
simply maximizing shareholders' wealth. The stakeholder model recognises 
that the well-being of other stakeholders associated with the firm, particularly 
employees, suppliers and customers, is important to a firm's long-term 
success. 
The model rests on the principle that the ethical treatment of employees, 
suppliers, and customers establishes long-term, trusting relationships 
between the firm and its stakeholders thereby supporting further profitable 
investments and contracts (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 9). These strong internal and 
external relationships can also provide a firm with competitive advantage. 
The stakeholder model is in line with the wider definition of corporate 
governance that recognises a firm's responsibility and accountability towards 
the various stakeholders that playa key role in its long-term success. 
The analysis of governance systems in Chapter 3 will again deal with these 
various approaches, as Anglo-American governance systems tend to support 
the principal-agent model, while the German and Japanese systems 
incorporate the stakeholder model. 
2.4 The relevance of corporate governance 
Although corporate governance is now a familiar topic, it was not the case 
before the 1990s and, internationally, the debate surrounding corporate 
governance has intensj'fied. Some of the main reasons for this heightened 
awareness of this issue are outlined below: 
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2.4.1 Director mismanagement and fraud 
Even though there are ample restraints on managerial behaviour such as the 
appointment of independent non-executive board· members, the internal and 
external audit process and the market for corporate control, management is 
still left with considerable discretion in the application of corporate assets. 
Notwithstanding apparently high corporate governance standards, incidents of 
mismanagement and fraud by directors frequently occur. Recent examples of 
such incidents in South Africa reported on in the popular press include 
Leisurenet, Regal Treasury Bank and Unifer. 
Leisurenet was declared insolvent in October 2000, with debts amounting to 
R681 million. The directors of the company neglected to reflect the true 
~ 
financial situation of the company in its 1999 annual report and a subsequent 
change in accounting policy showed significant drop in the 1999 results from a 
profit of R221 million to a loss of R60 million. The joint Chief Executive 
Officers of Leisurenet were later prosecuted; charges included fraudulent 
dealings that constituted a violation of the Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973) 
because they had direct or indirect interests in transactions which were in 
conflict with their fiduciary responsibility in Leisurenet. In addition, they were 
charged with income tax and value added tax (VAT) fraud. 
Following this, in June 2001, Regal Treasury Bank (Regal) was placed in 
curatorship, following unusually large-scale withdrawals by depositors. 
Regal's annual report for 2000 contained incorrect and incomplete 
information, creating incorrect perceptions among investors. In the 2000 
financial year, the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) total remuneration 
amounted to R17 million, including benefits, none which had been approved 
by the board, or disclosed in the annual financial statements. Adequate levels 
of non-executive representation at board level seem to have been absent, 
allowing the running of the company to be dominated by the CEO. 
2 Source: www.news24.com (refer to section 7 for further reference) 
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The third case, Unifer, a listed micro-loan company, collapsed in January 
2002, when it became apparent that provisions had to be made for significant 
bad debt because of irrecoverable loans. Absa (the second largest bank in 
South Africa) which held the majority stake in Unifer, lost a quarter of its share 
value as a result of Unifer's troubles, which can be attributed to 
mismanagement and poor internal control systems. The approval terms of, 
and procedures for advances were not properly controlled, while the systems 
for collecting and administering outstanding debts had serious deficiencies. 
These examples clearly illustrate the need for improved governance 
standards. 
2.4.2 Corporate failure 
In addition to management failure, the broader economic environment can 
influence corporate governance. Given the general downturn in the global 
stock markets following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New 
York on 11 September 2001, it has become difficult for companies to create 
shareholder value and the recent spate of profit warnings by large market 
players illustrates that this pressure seems to be increasing. 
One of the large South African banks, Saambou Bank was placed under 
curatorship in February 2002, because of serious liquidity problems following 
an abnormal outflow of funds out of the bank, and consequently many 
investors and clients incurred losses. The losses that stakeholders suffer 
when large corporations fail, reinforces the importance of improving 
mechanisms of corporate governance in order to protect them. 
2.4.3 Globalisation 
The market for products and services, as well as capital, has expanded during 
the past decades to incorporate the entire globe. Sound systems of 
governance are, therefore, becoming increasingly important for attracting 
11 
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foreign investment, or for establishing a company as a competitive, global 
supplier of products or services. This has been highlighted by the President 
of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn, who is quoted in the second King Report, 
as follows: 'Theo proper governance of companies will become as crucial to 
the world economy as the proper governing of countries" (King Report, 2002, 
Introduction and background, paragraph 7.2). 
2.4.4 Changes in the employment market 
During troubled times, restructuring or downsizing workforces are often used 
as cost-cutting measures often implemented to improve profitability. This has 
intensified labour and political action against apparently unsympathetic 
companies, as well as increased demand by employees for greater 
involvement in the decision-making and the governance procedures in 
companies; 
2.4.5 Executive remuneration 
Executive remuneration is a well-researched topic and a considerable number 
of studies have explored the relationship between CEO compensation and 
company performance. Most of these studies follow the principal-agent 
paradigm in which CEO compensation should serve as a mechanism for 
aligning managers' incentives with the interests of shareholders. A positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and company performance would 
therefore fit the agency theory (Barkema & Comez-Mejia, 1998; Cohen & 
Uliana, 1990). Researchers, however, often find a weak, or statistically 
insignificant relationship between pay and performance (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990; Kerr & Bettis, 1987). Other factors such as market forces, a firm's 
strategy (e.g. its product diversity and international diversity), demand 
instability, industry complexity and regulation, as well as the national tax 
system seem to influence the structure of executive compensation (Barkema 
& Comez-Mejia, 1998). 
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The extent of the influence of executive remuneration packages may be 
questionable, as the benefit thereof to stakeholders is not immediately evident 
from firm performance. A recent example illustrating this, is the case of the 
former South African Airways CEO, Coleman Andrews3, who earned R232 
million during his tWo-and-a-half years with the company, with a further R243 
million paid to consultants, among whom the biggest service provider was a 
company of which Andrews was a founder member. Even though he took 
certain positive steps to turn the company around, the extent of his 
remuneration is difficult to justify in relation to stakeholder benefit. 
The world-wide phenomenon of high executive compensation, regardless of 
how well shareholder funds are governed, clearly calls for corporate 
governance reform, which incorporates sound approval mechanisms or 
structures (e.g. via remuneration committees) as well as greater transparency 
(proper disclosure). 
The above examples provide some insight as to why corporate governance is 
still a topic for intense debate, both locally and internationally. It is apparent 
that while the factors influencing corporate governance, discussed above, 
remain relevant, current systems of governance should be under continuous 
scrutiny for weaknesses and that corporate governance reforms should be 
instituted where shortcomings are evident. 
This chapter outlined the objectives of corporate governance. Although 
covering a wide spectrum of aspects, it reiterates that a sound system of 
governance should promote management accountability to stakeholders, 
enhance the transparency of the company's affairs and in general, limit 
opportunities for management to abuse its power. 
3 Source: www.news24.com (refer to section 7 for further reference) 
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3 SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE 
Chapter 3 provides an analytical overview of different corporate governance 
systems. It will attempt to establish how well these systems meet the 
objectives of corporate governance,as stated in Chapter 2 and will form the 
base of further analysis in subsequent chapters. 
No governance system can be understood without looking at the salient 
features of the society in which it was shaped. Governance systems can, 
therefore, be viewed as products of historical events, legal, market and 
economic structures, as well as political forces. The following analysis of 
various systems will address aspects· like the features of the typical 
corporation, ownership and control thereof, the legal framework and market 
structure in which it operates, as well as the general investment perspective 
(long-term ownership versus short-term investors). 
3.1 Market governance 
3.1.1 The typical corporation: ownership and control thereof 
Corporate governance in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom 
(UK) developed through the emergence of joint stock companies and public 
stock exchanges. In the late 19th century, companies required substantial 
amounts of capital in order to support technological development. As they 
were no longer able to fund capital from internal resources or debt financing, 
they sought capital from investors who bought shares in their companies. 
Shareholders were the owners of the corporations, while a professional 
management team took charge of running the business. This process 
resulted in the typical Anglo-American or Berle-Means corporation (Berle & 
Means, 1932). A distinct feature of this type of corporation, is diffused 
shareholding among a number of stockholders, with management firmly in 
control of the operations. This structure is based on the principle that the 
owners (shareholders) appoint agents (directors) to manage the business, 
14 
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with the directors providing annual feedback in respect of their fiduciary 
duties. The directors, therefore, can delegate their powers and obligations to 
management, but they cannot abdicate them, creating accountability links 
between management and the directors, and directors and shareholders. The 
board of directors is therefore one of the key elements in a typical 
corporation's governance structure and the board's functions, to a large extent 
determines the effectiveness of the syste'm of accountability to shareholders. 
I n the US and UK, numerous statutes and codes rule the composition and 
functioning of boards. Some of these include: 
• The Company Act 1985 (UK) 
• In the US there is no Federal Companies Act; companies incorporate 
under the laws of the state of their choice. The main features relating to 
board selection and regulation according to US law are similar to the UK 
Company Act (Charkham, 1994: 182). 
• Stock Exchange and Takeover Panel Codes (UK) 
• Regulations of the various stock exchanges in the US (American. New 
York and Nasdaq). 
• Guidelines and documents e.g. the report and recommendations of the 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) on improving the effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees, the New York Stock Exchange and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers. 
A board's composition plays an important role in its ability to monitor the 
running of the business effectively. Both in the US and UK, boards function 
under a single-tier board system, which does not include employee 
representation and it is common for outside directors (non-executive directors 
in the UK) to constitute a significant portion of the board. This practice is 
believed to improve independent oversight of management and for the same 
purpose, separating the functions of chairman and CEO is widely advocated. 
Where the CEO is also chairman of the board, he is, in fact, monitoring his 
own executive performance. As stated by the Cad bury Code: 
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"There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the 
head of a company, which will ensure· a balance of power and 
authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of 
decision. Where the chairman is also the chief executive it is essential 
that there should be a strong independent element on the board, with a 
recognised senior member." 
(1992, par 1.2) 
It is common for boards to appoint committees to assist them in fulfilling their 
duties; The list of committees can be quite long, but the most important ones 
include: 
• Audit committees: The main duties of audit committees include 
appointment of the auditors, reviewing the scope and results of external 
and internal audits, reviewing the adequacy of the companies' accounting 
policies and practices, as well as reviewing the effectiveness and integrity 
of the systems of financial control (Charkham, 1994: 191). In the Cadbury 
Report (1992) and Blue Ribbon Report (1999), extensive 
recommendations are made regarding the composition and functioning of 
audit committees. 
• Remuneration committees: The purpose of this type of committee is to 
formulate the company's remuneration policy and establish guidelines in 
such a way that management and shareholders' interests are reconciled. 
In recent years, top executive remuneration has attracted much public 
interest, particularly when raises were not matched by increased profit 
performance. The solution lies in the effective functioning of a 
remuneration committee that usually consists of non-executive directors 
who can take an objective view on the competing interests of executive 
management and shareholders. 
• Executive committees: Their major role includes dealing with general 
management issues arising between board meetings. The nature of 
16 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
functions of such committees dictates that executive directors must 
actively participate in these. 
Institutional investors (including pension and mutual funds, insurance 
companies and trust companies) collectively own large stakes of the US and 
UK equity markets. In the UK, institutional shareholding increased from 
approximately 30% in 1963, to 62% in 1993 (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 19), and 
nearly half of the total US equ ity market is held by institutions (Scott, 1998). A 
large portion of this growth, in the UK, is attributable to indirect equity 
investments by individuals who use pension funds and life insurance as long-
term savings vehicles. Pension funds, in particular, are popular vehicles for 
individual investors' assets due to the tax benefits currently accruing to 
.. 
pension contributions and benefits (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 20). Pension funds 
are the largest form of institutional investor in the UK and hold UK shares for 
over half the value of their portfolios of assets. 
Even though institutions collectively own large stakes of the equity market, the 
shares held by individual institutions are generally low when measured 
against the market capitalization of companies. A further ownership feature of 
the US and UK stock market, is the widespread diffusion of shares among 
numerous, individual shareholders. 
3.1.2 Governance mechanisms 
In the US and UK, a key principle underpinning governance is the prinCiple of 
one-share-one-vote; effectively, ownership of shares entitles the holder to an 
equivalent and proportional right of control. The wide diffusion of shares, 
however, also means that voting rights are widely distributed, resulting in 
actual control being vested in the hands of a professional management feam 
tasked with optimising shareholder wealth. The CEO leads the team, usually 
in a dominant position, relative to the other board members. 
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This separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (management) 
leaves room for management to deviate from meeting the shareholders' 
objectives, because the allocation of company funds is left to management's 
discretion, which clearly gives rise to a potential conflict of interests. As a 
consequence, the· corporate governance systems in typical Anglo-American 
corporations are designed to minimise this potential conflict. Market related 
corporate governance mechanisms directed at aligning management's 
behaviour with shareholders' objectives may include market action, the market 
for corporate control and leveraged buyouts, each of which is discussed 
below: 
3.1.2.1 Market action 
~ 
An effective and liquid external market for equity exists in both the US and 
UK. These markets provide shareholders with an unrestricted and low-cost 
option to exit the market (sell their shares) when they are dissatisfied with a 
company's performance. Theoretically, if enough shareholders take the same 
action, the share price will drop. This collective action is a clear message to 
management that changes, congruent with the shareholders' objectives, are 
necessary. 
3.1.2.2 The market for corporate control 
Given the dispersed small shareholdings of the typical Anglo-American 
corporation and the high costs to the company, associated with collective 
action, the exit option normally dominates voice (right to vote). A further 
deterrent to collective action is the so-called free-rider problem where 
individual investors pay the price of remedial intervention, while other 
shareholders benefit from such action. Although the role of the shareholder 
voice, in this instance seems to be limited, it remains an important source of 
power. 
Among the various issues that shareholders might vote on, the right to vote on 
takeover bids, is the one issue that forms the centre of most discussions. 
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Since Manne (1965), the market for corporate control hypothesis has held that 
the ability of shareholders to vote for a managerial team's control, which offers 
them the greatest increase in shareholder wealth; represents the single most 
important constraint on managerial behaviour. The fact that any company 
can, at any time, be a potential takeover target, is an effective and ongoing 
governance control for all companies that ought to sharpen the focus of 
current management teams. 
The total value of takeovers in the US and UK, reflects the active market for 
corporate control and indicates its relevance as a mechanism for corporate 
governance. In the US, takeover value rose from $12 billion in 1975 to $268 
billion in 1988 and in the UK, mergers and takeovers peaked during 1988 at a 
total value of £16.87 billion (937 completed transactions). Even though the 
value of these transactions has dropped in both the US and UK, to less than 
$100 billion and £10.2 billion, respectively, in 1991, takeovers remain a 
powerful governance mechanism (Charkham, 1994: 215). 
Evidence supporting the notion that takeovers address governance problems, 
include the fact that takeovers typically result in an increase of the combined 
value of both the target and acquiring firms, indicating that profits are 
expected to increase subsequent to the takeover (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). 
Poorly performing firms are also often the targets for takeovers (Palepu, 1986) 
and are associated with the replacement of management once the takeover 
succeeds (Martin & McConnell, 1991). Takeovers are regarded as a key 
mechanism for corporate governance in the US and UK, in that they can 
effectively control managerial behaviour. 
3.1.2.3 Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) 
A leveraged buyout (LBO) generally involves a new group of investors, which 
usually includes management, specialised buyout firms, banks and public 
debt holders, and which buys the shares from the company's current 
shareholders (Jensen, 1989a: 1989b). In LBOs, managers generally have an 
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increased equity stake in the firm, with the buy-out firm typically effectively 
controlling the business. The transaction is financed through loans (extensive 
debt) and this, together with the personal sureties that management must 
provide in respect of this debt ensure that its behaviour is aligned with the 
goals of the other stakeholders. ' 
Available evidence indicates that LBOs result in efficient organisations. 
Kaplan (1989) found evidence from a sample of LBOs, that subsequently 
went public, that these businesses do increase their profits and are effective 
in both promoting management accountability to stakeholders (specifically 
other capital providers), as well as increasing shareholder wealth, thereby 
enhancing the level of governance. 
3.1.3 Legal and regulatory framework 
A country's legal framework significantly influences the features of its 
corporate governance systems. Examples may include the various statutes 
regulating ownership and control rights, e.g. by limiting the amount of equity 
that certain institutions own, the regulation of voting mechanisms as well as 
merger and acquisition activities. 
In the US, the political sentiment discouraging concentrated financial power 
has contributed to the low concentration of certain forms of institutional 
ownership in that country. Some of the regulations that influence the 
ownership structure include: 
• The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibits banks from underwriting 
stock or affiliating with investment banks that underwrite stock. 
• The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 that restricts bank holding 
companies from owning large shareholdings in companies not closely 
related to banking (Charkham, 1994: 196-197). 
• In 1906 life insurers were banned to own equity and 'the 1940 Investment 
Company Act required mutual funds to hold diversified portfolios with 
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penalties if a representative of the fund was appointed to the board of the 
company they invest in. 
Regulation of voting mechanisms that have an impact on the market for 
corporate control include the following: 
• In the US the use of multiple classes of stock was limited until the 1980s. 
The relaxation of the restrictions led to considerable growth in the 
issuance of dual class shares as a management protection mechanism 
during the 1980s active market for takeovers. 
• Until 1986, the New York stock exchange prohibited the use of dual class 
share arrangements, a rule that was established in 1926. 
• In Britain, the Companies Act was amended in 1948 to prohibit the 
issuance of non-voting shares. 
Legal restrictions in the US and UK prohibit group formation - a system that 
affects control in the hands of a minority shareholder or group of 
shareholders. 
• The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 banned pyramid holding 
companies; once a common feature in the American utilities industry. 
• Dividends flowing between separate legal entities within the US are 
taxable, constituting a further deterrent for the formation of holding 
companies. 
• In Britain, the London Stock Exchange prohibits the listing of a company 
whose main asset is the controlling shareholding in another listed 
company. 
In the US, the basic laws governing company structure are the State laws. 
There can be significant differences between the various States, opening the 
possibility for companies to incorporate in the State of their choice - probably 
where the governance regulations are most favourable to their circumstances. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also regulates many 
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processes affecting the governance of corporations. Examples of governance 
aspects not regulated by state laws, but by the SEC include: 
• Rules on the disclosure of executive remuneration. Disclosure 
requirement includes a detailed breakdown of annual and long-term 
compensation into its various components, performance graphs comparing 
the cumulative shareholders' returns to the return on a broad index such 
as the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index, as well as reports from 
compensation committees explaining the factors considered in determining 
executive compensation (Charkham. 1994: 185-186). These rules are 
aimed at greater transparency for shareholders. 
• Shareholder approval of employee stock option plans (Charkham, 1994: 
174-175). 
• Disclosure by persons who agree to take collective action if they together 
hold more than 5% of the company's shares. 
In the UK, the Take-over Panel (TOP), established in 1968, regulates 
takeovers. The TOP serves as both legislator and court, and promulgated the 
TOP Code, which has had a significant effect on the takeover process. 
Generally, the underlying themes of the code are those of transparency, 
timeliness, as well as equal and fair treatment of the shareholders concerned 
(Charkham, 1994: 306 - 307). 
3.1.4 Market structure 
Well-developed and liquid external capital markets are essential components 
of a market driven corporate governance model. From the statistics detailed 
below, it is evident that both the US and UK markets show these 
characteristics. 
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Stock exchanges in America4: 
• In December 2001, there were a total of 7 598 companies listed on the 
American Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange and the 
Nasdaq, with a total market capitalisation of $14717 billion. 
• The money raised on these stock exchanges from initial public offerings in 
the year 2001, amounted to $44,3 billion (2000: $112,5 billion), 
representing 101 (2000: 451) new offerings. 
• 795 billion shares were traded on these stock exchanges in 2001, 
amounting to a total value of $1 559 billion. 
London Stock Exchange (LSEt 
• On 31 December 2001, there were 2 891 companies (UK and' 
international) listed on the LSE, with a total market capitalisation of 
£4 115 billion. 
• For the year 2001, 304 new companies listed on the LSE, raising capital 
of £196 billion. 
• The number of equity shares traded totalled 1 803 billion, with an equity 
turnover value of £5581 billion. 
The liquid markets stimulate market-related corporate governance actions and 
provide shareholders with unlimited scope for selling their shares at fairly low 
costs when dissatisfied with their investment. 
3.1.5 The long-term versus short-term perspective 
As already indicated, institutions hold and manage significant stakes in the US 
and UK equity markets. The ability to activate certain governance 
mechanisms e.g. appointing the board of directors or voting on takeover 
issues depends, to a large extent, on whether shareholders, including 
institutions, exercise the ownership rights inherent in' the shares. The 
4 Source: http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com 
5 Source: http://www.londonstockexchange.com (quarterly fact file) 
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objectives and perspectives of institutions will therefore influence the 
effectiveness of those governance mechanisms that depend on the active 
pursuit of ownership rights. 
Charkham (1994:· 283) argues that institutions often view shares as 
commodities that can be readily traded in an active market. From this point of 
view, institutions see themselves as fund managers with a concomitant need 
for freedom to move funds around in order to maximize the returns for the 
beneficiaries of those funds (institutions). Contrary to the short-term 
investors' view, institutions may act as the owners of a corporation and 
therefore take on the responsibility of shareholders, as defined in the 
Companies Act. This longer-term ownership perspective assumes the 
monitoring of a company's management and when necessary, accepts the 
cost of intervention in order to increase investment returns. This dual role of 
institutional investors, as both shareholder and investor, results in a conflicting 
situation: from the investors perspective investment performance is measured 
over short term horizons, forcing them to focus more on short term profit 
maximization, while the shareholder view is orientated towards the longer-
term. Should a single institution take costly action to intervene in company 
management policy, returns will be lower than their competitors', which at 
least in the short term, will be detrimental to their beneficiaries and may result 
In th~ loss of clients. 
The substantial institutional stakes in the US and UK markets, means that 
they cannot divest from companies on a large scale. This supports the long-
term investors' perspective and calls for collective action to improve the 
standard of corporate governance. In the Cadbury Report (1992), institutions 
are urged to take on the role of large shareholders and to monitor the 
management of the company on behalf of the small shareholders. 
Macey (1998) argues in favour of the investors' perspective that institutional 
investors should focus on reducing their cost as well as eliminating firm-
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specific risk by constructing balanced portfolios of shares. Both these 
strategies are inconsistent with a long-term perspective of monitoring. 
Macey's argument is based on the modern portfolio theory of diversification 
that eliminates firm-specific risk. According to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, investors are only compensated for bearing non-diversifiable risks. 
Gaining benefit from long-term relationship investments, coupled with ongoing 
interceptive actions, seem to fly in the face of these theories. 
A phenomenon that supports the investor's objective rather than that of the 
owner, is indexed matching, where investors buy all the shares in a given 
index and the funds are weighted identically to the index, itself. This passive 
form of institutional fund-management, will in some cases, encourag~ 
managers to take a longer-term perspective, but will not necessarily lead to 
increased intervention because fund managers will be driven by investment 
performance against an index (Charkham, 1994: 209, 283; Keasey, et ai, 
1997: 24). Again, the problem arises that intervention results in increased 
management cost& for an individual fund manager, with potential benefit for 
the non-intervening index-matched funds. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that active participation in the corporate 
governance of a corporation calls on investors to take a longer-term view of 
their investments and therefore requires them to exercise the ownership rights 
to which they are entitled. Indexed matching, or passive portfolio 
management, reduces the need for shareholders to actively monitor the 
companies they invest in. 
3.1.6 Criticism 
Among the market governance mechanisms mentioned in 3.1.2, takeovers 
feature most prominently. Criticisms of the effectiveness of takeovers as a 
governance mechanism include the following: 
• Takeovers are expensive, increasing the likelihood that only significant 
performance failures will be addressed. Apart from the cost of a takeover, 
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the bidder may need to pay the target firm's shareholders a price related 
the expected increase in profits from his management. Should the bidder 
fail to do this, the current shareholders will often be reluctant to sell their 
shares, as they would become more valuable after a successful takeover. 
• Takeovers can increase the bidding agency's costs if it pays an inflated 
price for an acquisition to achieve the private benefits of control (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1988). Acquisitions are not necessarily used for disciplinary 
purposes, but can also provide the bidder's management with the means 
of increasing their empires or diversifying current operations. Jensen 
(1993) indicates that of the hostile takeover activity in the 1980s in the US, 
only a small portion had disciplinary intentions. 
• The anti-takeover legislation that contributed to the decline of the 1980s 
takeover wave shows that using the takeover as a mechanism for 
corporate governance is vulnerable to political opposition or interferenc;e. 
(Jensen, 1993). 
3.2 Bank governance: the German governance system 
3.2.1 The typical corporation: ownership and control thereof 
The most common framework for companies in German industry is the 
incorporated company, specifically, the following two types: 
• Gesellschaft mit beschrankte Haftung (GmbH) or company with limited 
liability; 
• Aktiengelleschaft (AG) or share company (Charkham, 1994: 15). 
The number of listed companies in Germany is relatively low. At the end of 
1992 only 664 out of the 3 219 AGs were listed, while AGs accounted for only 
about 20% of business turnover at that time. Market activity is dominated by 
a few large AGs and in 1991, a mere 50 companies accounted for more than 
85% of domestic share trades (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 235). It is evident that, in 
Germany, the stock market plays a far less significant role in facilitating 
corporate control, than in the US or UK. A key characteristic of the numerous 
non-listed firms is highly concentrated ownership with a close correlation 
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between owners and managers. As a result, the scope for principal-agent 
conflicts, a feature of the Anglo-American company, is more limited. This is 
typical of the German entrepreneurial culture, which is known for its aversion 
to both public disclosure requirements and sharing control with outsiders. 
In Germany, non-financial enterprises hold the largest stake of issued equities 
(39% in 1993). Concentrated ownership, in the form of large block-holdings is 
a common feature of German business. The holdings of pension funds and 
insurance companies are relatively insignificant - approximately 15%, jointly, 
in 1993 and is due to the fact that two-thirds of employees' pension 
contributions can be retained within the company and utilised as a source of 
internal finance (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 245). 
The importance of stakeholders, particularly employees and customers, 
relative to shareholders can be illustrated by the accounting policy adopted by 
German companies. While the UK accounts should reflect a true and fair 
view of the company's affairs, the German audit approach, which is 
entrenched by legislation, is based on commercial prudence (Charkham, 
1994: 31). Risks are generally provided for in the balance sheet as reserves 
for difficult financial times. This clearly indicates that the continuity of the 
business is more highly rated than communicating profits to shareholders. 
3.2.2 Governance mechanisms 
Low reliance on capital markets means that the German governance system 
is significantly different from that of the Anglo-American model. Actions like 
hostile takeovers, or shareholder activism by large institutions, are not key 
features in this market, and the corporate governance system is greatly 
influenced the by the two-tier board structure and the distinctive role of banks 
in Germany. 
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3.2.2.1 Bank influence 
German banks have, in a number of areas, close relationships with industrial 
companies. In the early days of industrialisation, businesses turned to the 
banks for long-term financing. In turn, the banks realised the long-term nature 
of their lending and perceived the need to build relationships with their 
customers. This, consequently, improved information flow from company to 
bank, which is essential to the banks in understanding their customers and 
the industries in which they operate. (Charkham, 1994: 36). To secure 10ng-
term relationships with clients, banks extend their lending services together 
with a range of further services, including management consultancy. 
Apart from providing debt financing, banks are also important shareholders in~ 
listed equities and, in 1993, held 14% of issued stock (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 
236). Many of their holdings were acquired from companies, which could only 
settle their debt with an offer of equity (shareholding) in the business. 
Private and corporate investors generally deposit their shares with the banks, 
which are authorised to perform the work of shareholders, on a professional 
basis. Consequently, the banks' influence through proxy voting has a far 
more signi"ficant impact than their direct holdings. Banks are obliged, by law 
to give shareholders advice and to consult them about voting instructions. 
They will therefore send their views on how to vote to shareholders and in the 
absence of a different instruction from the shareholder, will exercise proxy 
votes accordingly (Charkham, 1994: 38). Exercising voting rights means that 
banks profoundly influence the composition of executive bodies, managing 
boards, as well as supervisory boards in German corporations. This is 
illustrated by the fact that, on average, banks collectively represent more than 
83% of all votes, present at meetings, with the three big banks accounting for 
45% of the votes present (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 237). 
This combination of long-term lending, direct ownership and proxy voting 
rights, reflects the strong relationship between companies and banks, and 
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accompanied by intimate knowledge of customers' businesses, give banks the 
authority to influence the company's management. 
3.2.2.2 Two-tier board structure 
The German corporation operates under a two-tier board system, comprising 
a lower, executive board of managers, and an upper, non-executive 
supervisory board. For firms with between 500 and 2 000 employees, a two-
tier board system with one-third employee representation is compUlsory. 
Firms with more than 2 000 employees have a similar structure, but 50% of 
the representatives are selected by shareholders, and the other 50% by 
. employees and trade unions. The chairman of the supervisory board has a 
casting vote and will always be a shareholder representative (Charkham,~ 
1994: 18). 
This system originated during the industrialisation of Germany, during the 
second half of the 19th century. It has already been noted that in the absence 
of well-developed stock markets, the banks supplied the large amounts of 
capital required for industrial growth, resulting in close relationships with their 
clients, and board membership. In 1884, the supervisory board was made 
compulsory and further legislation, in 1937, formalized the separation 
between the executive responsibilities of the managing board and the control 
function of the supervisory board (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 243). 
The purpose of the two-tier system is to put management supervision in the 
hands of a committee of shareholders and employee representatives. With 
the separation of management (control) and ownership, specifically where 
there is a dominating managing board in control, the functions of the 
supervisory board become increasingly important. The objective of the 
supervisory board is to ensure that the interests of the managers coincide 
with those of the stakeholders in the business. The role of employees, as 
stakeholders, is enhanced by the fact that two-thirds of their pension fund 
contributions are retained within the company, as a source of internal 
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funding, Further benefits from co-determination by employees include 
improved labour relations and union co-operation. 
3.2.3 Legal and regulatory framework 
Regulations that impact on the governance mechanisms of a particular 
country, as already noted when the discussing the typical Anglo-American 
corporations, include those regulating the concentration of ownership, voting 
mechanisms, or merger and takeover activities. Some of the laws and 
regulations that apply to German corporations include the following: 
• Pension and insurance funds are subject to rules limiting the investment of 
their assets; of the assets held to cover current obligations, only 20% can ~ 
be invested in equities and the total stake in anyone company is limited to 
10% (Charkham, 1994: 27). These regulations, coupled with the retention 
of pension contributions in companies as a source of working capital, 
further explains why the German capital market in Germany is less 
developed than in the UK and US. 
• Although it has no significant impact on German banks, the Second 
Banking Co-ordination Directive (adopted in December 1989) limited a 
banks' shareholdings in individual companies to 15% of its capital, and the 
total of such holdings to 60% (Charkham, 1994: 37). 
• As discussed in section 3.2.2.2, German law regulates mandatory nature 
and composition of supervisory boards. The authority and tasks of the 
supervisory board are also prescribed and include appointments to the 
executive board, approving dividend payments, approving the company's 
accounts for a specified period, approval of significant capital expenditure 
and strategic investments (Charkham, 1994: 22). 
•. Representation on the supervisory board generally serves as mechanism 
for the protection of shareholder rights. The decision-making responsibility 
of the supervisory board is, however, limited and further legal protection of 
shareholders against negligent executive boards seems lacking: for 
shareholders to act against management, would require a majority of votes 
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at a general meeting, or at least 10% of votes to file a court objection 
(Scott, 1998). 
3.2.4 Market structure 
As discussed in section 3.2.1, and unlike the US and UK, the market does not 
playa significant role in facilitating corporate control in Germany. The stock 
market does not attract large proportions of German savings, nor is the stock 
market a particularly large source of capital for companies. Although merger 
activity takes place quite often for normal commercial reasons, hostile 
takeovers seldom occur. The international trend of greater concentration of 
market share by major companies has been achieved through merger activity. 
3.2.5 The long"term versus short"term perspective 
The German system of governance recognises a wider range of stakeholders 
than just the shareholders and as a result, the longer-term stability and 
interests of the company remain key focus areas for the business. Because 
the combined stock holdings of companies and banks are far more signi'flcant 
than the holdings of private shareholders, and as noted in section 3.2.2.1, 
they have means at tbeir disposal to exercise influence, they understand the 
business and tend to take a long-term view. 
The absence of a constant takeover threat has encouraged this long term 
view, and German investors are known to prefer slow, steady increases in 
earnings and major reinvestment in assets and development costs, rather 
than high distributions (Charkham, 1994: 52). 
3.2.6 Criticism 
The strong bank influence and supervisory board system that form part of the 
German corporate governance model are regarded as positive attributes in 
promoting executive board accountability to shareholders. A number of 
aspects of the German corporate governance system have, however, been 
criticized and include the following: 
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• The effectiveness of the supervisory board has been questioned in the 
. sense that the board is dependent on information provided by the 
executive board on issues concerning the corporation's current state of 
affairs and areas of risk. 
• A further problem inherent in the German system, is its inability to cope 
with the increasing globalisation of businesses, coupled with its lack of 
transparency and disclosure (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 248). While 
international capital markets allow German corporations to select their 
providers of finance, they will escape their traditional monitors, however, 
the greater reliance of German corporations on international capital 
markets might lead to a decline in profitability for banks in monitoring 
management's performance. Furthermore, increased globalisation may 
result in a call for changes to accounting and information policies. 
• The extent of the house banks' monitoring powers could also be an area 
of concern. Their independence as objective monitors can be questioned 
when considering the effective control exercised by the largest banks. 
Collectively, the five largest universal banks cast between 54% and 64% 
of votes at their own shareholders' meetings in 1992 (Scott, 1998). 
Outside shareholders, and/or market forces, seem to have little 
constraining power over the power of banks, leaving effective monitoring 
at the discretion of bank managers. 
3.3 Bank governance: the Japanese governance system 
3.3.1 The typical corporation: ownership and control thereof 
There are generally three types of corporations in Japan, namely commercial 
partnerships, limited partnerships and limited companies. Even though only a 
small percentage of companies are listed, they account for a substantial 
proportion of turnover, due to the numerous associated, unlisted companies 
(Charkham, 1994: 75). 
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The typical corporation structure or "Keiretsu6" consists of a group of 
companies forming a complex finance and supplier network, which links 
member companies through cross-shareholdirigs and customer-supplier 
relationships. The six largest Keiretsu are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-Ichi Kangyo (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 181). 
The Keiretsu developed from the pre-war Zaibatsu structure. The Zaibatsu 
comprised a holding company, controlled by the founding family which, in 
turn, controlled a number of industrial and financial companies, including the 
major banks (Charkham, 1994: 75). During the US occupation of Japan, in 
1945, the Zaibatsu were dissolved and the controlling families' shareholdings 
were confiscated and sold off, resulting in a substantial decline in cross-
holdings (8erglof & Perotti, 1994). During the 1950s and 1960s, the inter-firm 
relationships progressively reemerged and in addition, new groups formed 
around the large city banks. A significant change from the previous Zaibatsu 
was the substitution of hierarchical holding company control with horizontal 
co-ordination resulting in cross-company trading and bank lending. 
One of the main features of the Keiretsu, noted above, is the extensive cross-
holdings of shares among member firms. Even though each individual 
company normally only has a small equity holding in another member firm, the 
combined shares of member companies are typically large enough to ensure 
that the group can control its members. 
Holdings by group financial institutions play an important role in most 
Keiretsu. Typically, the Keiretsu's main bank holds between 2 and 5% (5% 
being the legal limit) of a member's equity. In addition to equity stakes, the 
groups' banks extend substantial amounts of debt financing to member 
6 There are two types of Keiretsu in Japan - horizontal and vertical. The vertical Keiretsu 
consists of a main manufacturer and its affiliated subcontractors. The reference to "Keiretsu" 
in this section refers to the horizontal structure. 
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companies. Keiretsu firms further rely heavily on inter-group lending through 
trade credits (8erglof & Perotti, 1994). 
The Keiretsu groups usually include members from a wide range of industries. 
Because members usually do not compete in the same industry, there are 
seldom overlaps in terms of the main product lines and consequently, 
extensive trade relationships exist between virtually all group member 
companies. Cross holdings of blocks of stock are often viewed by businesses 
as mechanisms for obtaining new business rather than realising investment 
return (McDonald, 1998). The mutual trade and finance relationships within a 
group have implications for the composition and the size of groups. Firms 
that are likely to be affiliated with the group will include those with the greatest 
~ 
potential to benefit from long-term, cooperative relationships. The addition of 
a new firm can only be justified if the expected benefits of collaboration 
outweigh the costs of adding another member to the group. It is also more 
likely that members that are comparable in size will support inter-group 
relations, which is not the case with hierarchical relationships (8erglof & 
Perotti, 1994). 
A characteristic of Japanese boards is the low representation of non-
executive or outside directors, when compared with the US/UK model. Even 
though, by law, directors need the support of a third of the shareholders to be 
selected, Japanese company directors are often full-time employees, or 
engaged in managing the business (Charkham, 1994: 85). Large 
corporations are controlled by a management committee, comprising the top 
layer of directors, which is responsible for decision-making, and the board of 
directors has a more ceremonial role. 
Japanese boards tend to be far bigger than their western counterparts to 
include the employees who have progressed to the top of the organisation 
and have been elected to serve on the board in recognition for long and loyal 
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service. Consequently, Japanese boards tend not to playa significant role in 
the objective control of the management of an organisation. 
The increased focus on corporate governance issues in Japan is, however, 
beginning to bring about changes in individual corporations. The average 
board size seems to be declining. for example, Sony, which has reduced its 
board from 38 directors to 10, of whom three are outsiders and Long-Term 
Credit Bank reduced its board from 28 to six. It should be noted that 
companies making these drastic changes are those with substantial global 
interests - Sony's stock is listed on the London and New York stock 
exchanges and over 40% of its shares are held by foreign shareholders. It is 
more difficult for the traditional Japanese corporations to reduce the number 
~ 
of directors because this would exclude a number of career executives from 
being recognised for loyal service to the company. The number of suitable, 
independent outside directors is also limited because of the extensive 
Keiretsu groupings (Goldstein. 1998), and all these factors will effectively limit 
scope for board reform in the short-term. 
A further feature of corporate governance in the Japanese model, is the 
function of statutory auditors, appointed by the shareholders. In terms of 
Articles 273-80 of the Commercial Code, the function of statutory auditors is 
to audit the directors' activities to ensure that business is conducted in 
accordance with the applicable laws and the company's regulations and in the 
best interest of the shareholders. Their aim is to prevent any improper 
activities, which might lead to the company being held liable to any third party. 
In reality their role is. often regarded as a formality, and lacking real 
substance. In order to fulfil their duties, access to relevant information on 
important business and financial decisions is required. Support in terms of 
allowing statutory auditors to attend board meetings and arranging interviews 
with company presidents seems to be inadequate for this auditing function to 
fully achieve its purpose (Charkham, 1994: 93). 
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3.3.2 Governance mechanisms 
The main governance structures in Japan are a result of the typical Keiretsu 
groupings. 
3.3.2.1 Mutual monitoring among group firms 
As previously mentioned, the Keiretsu is a group of companies operating in 
different industries, but involving long-term relationships through extensive 
trade relationships and equity stakes in the various members' companies. 
The joint controlling stake owned in one firm, by other firms in the group, 
ensures a mutual commitment to monitoring the management of that firm. 
With their combined voting rights, the alliance can influence the company's 
strategy and ensure that management acts to the benefit of stakeholders. 
The frequent trading between partners in the group can lead to further 
monitoring opportunities, because it provides a base for the exchange of 
financial and production information that can be used for continuous 
performance evaluation. In order to obviate the problem of members 
withholding information about an insolvent firm in the group (protecting the 
failing member's management from settling their trade claim in return), the 
Keiretsu's main bank often guarantees trade claims. This provides incentives 
for timely reporting of poor performance and insolvency (8erglof & Perotti, 
1994). 
Mutual monitoring may be compared with governance arrangements that rely 
on threat of loss of managerial control. Similar to the takeover market in the 
US and UK, mutual monitoring poses a real threat to management, in that 
individuals might be replaced or demoted. In this instance. the internal 
substitution of management is likely to be more cost effective and less 
disruptive than corporate control changes enforced by external investors 
(8erglof & Perotti, 1994). 
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Furthermore, the intense competition between the various Keiretsu further 
enforces strict discipline within the group (Berglof& Perotti, 1994). 
3.3.2.2 Main bank monitoring 
The self-controlled coalition of managers, as described above, may potentially 
lead to a situation where managers protect each other from outside 
interference. The absence of an objective monitoring mechanism is clearly 
not desirable, from a stakeholder and shareholder perspective. 
In order to alleviate this potential collusive arrangement, member firms fund 
themselves extensively through debt financing from the main bank. As 
principal provider of finance, the main bank becomes the controlling bod~ 
when a member firm defaults and is relatively well-positioned to obtain 
information about a member's strategy, performance and management. Debt 
repayments provide a regular source of interaction and payment default will 
clearly signal profitability problems. It also often occurs that employees of the 
main bank are appointed as board members in member-group firms, and 
incentives seem to be sufficiently strong for main banks to fulfil this monitoring 
function. As holders of equity and providers of debt financing, they can 
protect their investments by monitoring and limiting the financial burden 
involved in the restructuring of a failing member (Kaysey, et ai, 1997: 182). 
3.3.2.3 Cultural norms of the Keiretsu system 
Apart from sharing the Keiretsu name and logo, group members, as already 
mentioned, interact in many ways: trade relationships, debt, equity holdings, 
employee exchange networks and group-wide councils. This mUlti-level 
interaction has established a sense of cohesion among group members and 
the intense competition between various Keiretsu further facilitates solidarity 
between group members. Being part of a Keiretsu group implies adhering to 
the principles and codes of the group, as well as living up to the expectations 
of other group members. The Keiretsu structure therefore enforces strict 
discipline within the group. 
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3.3.3 Legal and regulatory framework 
The legal framework that impacts on governance mechanisms includes the 
following: 
• The Commercial Code, which governs the structure and conduct of 
companies, including the annual general meetings and the board of 
directors. 
• Legal ownership restrictions that include, as noted above, limiting banks 
from holding more than 5% of the total equity of a firm and allowing 
groups of financial institutions to hold up to 40% of the total equity in a 
firm (Berglof & Perotti, 1994). 
• The Japan Pension Fund Association regulates and administers the 
national pension scheme for employees working at companies with less 
than 500 employees and released a set of guidelines on exercising 
shareholder voting rights, in June 1998. These urge pension asset 
managers to actively oversee the management of corporations and 
focuses on increasing investment return for pension beneficiaries. 
Further, the guidelines promote adequate and timely disclosure of 
information on corporate activities. Through exercising voting rights, 
pension fund managers can influence the size, function, and composition 
of corporate boards, as well as both the profit distribution and business 
strategies (McDonald, 1998). 
• The Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) and the influential business group 
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) both issued corporate 
governance proposals emphasising the need to strengthen the audit 
system and change the rules governing shareholder lawsuits. Both 
proposals require that a majority of each company's internal auditors be 
independent, with independent being defined as a person who has never 
worked for the company, or a subsidiary. This means that retired 
executives may not be classified as independent, even after a five-year 
nominal separation from the companies where they worked their entire 
lives. In addition, auditors who resign in the middle of their terms must 
now provide reasons for doing so. Where shareholders' interests are 
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protected through improved audit systems, the restrictions on shareholder 
lawsuits, however, pose further limitations to investors. In both proposals, 
it is a requirement that shareholder plaintiffs should have owned stock in 
the corporation at the time of the incident, giving rise to the suit. 
Shareholders who bought shares after the incident occurred, but before it 
became public are left with no legal recourse for losses because of the 
incident. Companies would further be allowed to indemnify directors in 
derivative suits. These proposals from Japanese corporations, and their 
political allies, are clearly set to restrict the number of shareholder suits 
(Goldstein, 1998). 
• The Corporate Governance Forum of Japan (CGFJ) has issued a 
comprehensive code on the principles of corporate governance. The 
principles to be adopted in the short-term include improved disclosure to 
shareholders on information affecting their interests, reducing the number 
of directors so as to facilitate more effective decision-making and the 
inclusion of independent, outside directors on boards. The longer-term 
principles, which will require substantial legal reforms, include 
independent outsiders comprising the majority on corporate boards, 
establishment of remuneration and audit committees, as well as 
separating the roles of chairman and chief executive officer. 
• Stock options were first legalised in Japan in 1997 and a number of 
companies introduced stock option plans for their executives and 
directors. The weaknesses of the stock market have, however, lead to a 
decline in the attractiveness of stock options (Goldstein. 1998). Further 
profit-sharing devices such as bonus systems and stock-holding plans, 
have been introduced as part of an effort to align profit maximizing for 
shareholders with maximizing profits for all stakeholders (Report of the 
CGFJ, 1997). 
3.3.4 Market structure 
The Japanese stock market is an important source of corporations' external 
capital. Due to large block holdings (the various Keiretsu cross-holdings, 
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previously discussed), a high proportion of shares is in stable hands. As a 
result, trading in the market is unlikely to occur when a hostile bid is made for 
a particular company. Management therefore pays little attention to any 
threat of take-over and, as a consequence, the market is not an effective 
mechanism for disciplining management's behaviour. Willing, or arranged 
mergers, in the case of failing companies often occur. 
3.3.5 The long-term versus short-term perspective. 
The dominant view in Japan generally seems to favour the long-term 
preservation and prosperity of companies above maximizing shareholders' 
value. Japanese companies value employees and customers just as highly 
as, or even more than their shareholders. This stakeholder approach is in 
~ 
stark in contrast from the Anglo-American model that mainly revolves around 
the shareholder. 
The collective monitoring system inherent in the Japanese governance model 
relies on a long-term, stable ownership structure, which means that structure 
and relationships within a Keiretsu group are therefore orientated towards the 
long-term. A consistent ownership structure is supported by the procedures 
for allocation of voting rights in the event of an equity issue· or the sale of 
shareholdings by a Keiretsu firm (8erglof & Perotti, 1994). The main bank 
often intervenes when a group member is selling its equity by allocating the 
share, proportionally among group members. 
3.3.6 Criticism 
A number of areas of the Japanese governance structures have been 
criticised and include the following: 
• The vested trade and shareholding interests, mean that rules other than 
normal business principles may apply to under-performing firms, which 
means that the Keiretsu structure can lead to non-viable firms being kept 
alive longer than practical (8erglof & Perotti, 1994). 
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• The recent trend towards loosening the Keiretsu ties may suggest that the 
structure is not flexible enough to meet the demands of global competition 
(Berglof & Perotti, 1994). 
• According to Coffee (1991) the main Keiretsu bank receives a premium 
(above market interest rates on loan financing) in return for its monitoring 
functions. As shareholders should be able to diversify to protect 
themselves against company-specific losses, they are disadvantaged 
when above market interest rates are paid on debt financing. The main 
bank's monitoring commitments to members, therefore, mainly benefit 
management and protect the bank's interests, at the expense of the 
outside shareholders. 
• In addition, bank intervention is often restricted to the event of a keiretzu 
member becoming financially distressed, and therefore banks cannot to 
offer an ongoing monitoring mechanism (Coffee, 1991). 
3.4 Holding company governance 
3.4.1 The typical corporation: ownership and control thereof 
The holding company, or pyramid structure, is a corporate arrangement 
commonly found in countries like Sweden, France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, 
Korea and South Africa. A holding company is one whose assets contain 
shares in another company. The holding company, by owning more than 50% 
of its subsidiary company, can exercise full control over it. A pyramid 
company can therefore be defined as a company whose only, or main asset, 
consists of a controlling shareholding in another company, for the express 
purpose of exercising control. The ultimate ownership of the holding company 
at the top of the pyramid is usually concentrated, while ownership of the 
subsidiary companies is more widely diffused among outside shareholders 
(Barr, et ai, 1995). 
The concentration of control in the hands of a minority shareholder can be 
accomplished by introducing various layers of holding companies into the 
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organisation, thus forming a pyramid structure. The rationale behind 
employing this structure is often to enable the owner and manager to raise 
additional financing without compromising control of the operating company. 
Where the controlling shareholder's holdings have already been reduced to 
50%, additional capital cannot be raised without losing total control of the 
operating company. By transferring its shareholding to a pyramid or holding 
company, further shares can be issued, thereby diluting the shareholdings in 
the holding company rather than in the operating company. Once the 
shareholdings in the holding company decrease to a level of 50%, the 
underlying equity stake in the operating company would have reduced to 25% 
(i.e. 50% of 50%). Control over the operating company is, however, 
maintained as the controlling shareholder holds the majority of votes in the 
, 
holding company, while the holding company in turn holds the majority of 
votes in the operating company. By repeating this process and forming yet 
another holding company, which takes up 50% of the shares in the previous 
holding company, the main shareholder's equity stake is further diluted to 
12,5%, without any effective change in the control of the operating company. 
This structure illustrates how the distribution of shareholders' voting rights 
(control) is no longer linked to the underlying equity stakes (Gerson & Barr, 
1994). 
Through the use of pyramid holding company structures, a shareholder-
controlled environment is created in contrast to the management-controlled 
environment in the US or UK (Kantor, 1998). Unlike in the US or UK, where 
agency conflict exists between shareholders as owners and management as 
controllers, the conflict here arises between the controlling minority 
shareholder and the majority shareholders. Being the controlling shareholder 
does not necessarily mean owning the rights and dividends of the companies 
it controls. A South African example where this occurred is when the 
Oppenheimer family controlled 40% of the value of· the JSE Securities 
Exchange South Africa ("JSE"), but owned only about 8% of the value of the 
Anglo American Corporation (Kantor, 1998). 
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The method of raising financing through introducing additional holding 
companies into the group, can be repeated indefinitely, as long as there are 
willing buyers of shares who are satisfied with not having effective controlling 
rights. A key feature influencing the market demand for this type of share 
issue, is the reputation of the controlling shareholder among the investor 
community (Barr, et ai, 1995). It is easier for successful entrepreneurs with 
well-established reputations to raise funding, at the right price, in this way, 
than for company owners that do not have proven track records. 
3.4.2 Governance mechanisms 
By controlling the ultimate holding company at the top of the pyramid, control 
~ 
over the various operating subsidiaries is automatically obtained. Although it 
may vary in levels of intensity, the controlling shareholder normally actively 
participates in the management and strategy of the operating companies. By 
holding the majority of votes, strong influence is exercised through the 
appointment of management teams and boards of directors, and the 
controlling shareholder plays a monitoring role by reviewing the performance 
of the operating companies' management teams. Through consolidation of 
the results of the various operating companies, information flow to the holding 
company is effected, thereby improving the monitoring capabilities of the 
controlling shareholder. In this structure, replacing under-performing 
management teams is a relatively easy and inexpensive task to perform, 
when compared with the extensive procedures of market driven disciplinary 
actions. 
It is also common for holding companies to provide guarantees for the 
operating companies in a group, thereby decreasing the bankruptcy risk and 
enabling the operating companies to source external financing at more 
favourable rates. Guarantees, and often loan financing provided to operating 
companies, increase the incentive for the holding company to monitor the 
performance of its operating companies. 
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The sustainability of the holding company structure is dependent on its ability 
to protect and grow shareholder value. As the majority of shareholders need 
to willingly invest in a company, knowing that they will, for all practical 
purposes, own "voteless" shares, the holding company's governance has to 
earn investors' confidence. One way of doing this is by producing superior 
returns for these shareholders. 
Barr, et al (1995) evaluated the performance of South African conglomerates 
in order to determine whether group structures can be justified. They found 
that the five large mining houses, all pyramid structures, produced average 
returns for the period 1981 through to 1992 that outperformed the All Share 
~ 
Index and exceeded the CPI by about 550 basis points. They also found that 
over the period January 1989 to June 1993, the mining houses, without 
exception, provided significantly higher returns when compared to the returns 
that an individual investor would have earned, holding the same proportion of 
listed investments, independent of the holding company. The mining houses 
seemed to have created shareholder value over and above the value of their 
listed holdings and thereby proved the pyramid or holding company to be an 
effective governance system in the context of protecting and increasing 
shareholder value. Barr, et al identified a number of other characteristics of 
effective holding company governance, including: 
• The higher the reputation of the controlling shareholder, the lower the 
potential percentage claim to dividends from the operating companies 
under its control. 
• Where the controller's equity stake is well in excess of his remuneration 
as manager or director, his incentives would be better aligned with those 
of the outside shareholders, making it more attractive for them to invest in 
"voteless" shares. 
Both these features seem to enhance the standard of corporate governance, 
thereby supporting the existence of holding company governance. 
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3.4.3 Legal and regulatory framework 
As usual, legal rules and policies often significantly shape corporate 
governance frameworks. In the US and UK the principle of "one-share-one 
vote" is strongly promoted and regulations entrenching this include: 
• The banning of pyramid holding' companies, once a prominent feature in 
the American utilities industry, in terms of the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935. 
• Also in the US, the taxation of dividend flows between separate legal 
entities within a group constrains the formation of holding companies. 
• It is contrary to London Stock Exchange regulations to list a company 
whose main asset is a controlling shareholding in another listed company., 
In countries where these regulations do not apply, pyramid group structures 
may provide a beneficial way of structuring operations, and financing a 
corporation. 
3.4.4 Market structure 
Large, diversified groups can exercise control over significant portions of the 
market. This is specifically true for South Africa where, in 1999, five groups 
controlled approximately 63% of equity issued on the JSE (measured in terms 
of market capitalisation) (McGregor, 2000). As a result, market controlled 
governance mechanisms like hostile takeovers are virtually impossible to 
execute. Shareholders must depend on the controlling shareholder to align 
his goals with those of the shareholders and act in their best interests. 
Among these interests is replacing under-performing executive teams, which, 
as indicated earlier, is a relatively easy task given the absence of proxy or 
takeover battles. 
3.4.5 The long-term versus short-term perspective 
Group structures are generally formed with the purpose of establishing long-
term control. As a result, the controlling shareholder usually takes a long-term 
view on the management and strategy of the corporation. The controlling 
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owner's active participation in the running of the business, as well as the often 
significant personal stakes involved, supports a long-term investment 
approach. 
3.4.6 Criticism 
One of the reasons why an owner of a business may want to utilise a holding 
company structure for further share issues, is to finance investments 
unrelated to the current core business, thereby diversifying his portfolio. 
Corporate diversification has been strongly criticised in the past, as it often 
lacks clear focus and compromises shareholder returns. Non-controlling 
shareholders, therefore, run the risk of reduced returns when investing in 
diversified groups still effectively controlled by the original owner. 
Further potential conflict between the controlling shareholder and other 
minority shareholders may include excessive benefits paid to the controlling 
shareholder, as well as a potential succession problem when the controlling 
owner steps down (Barr, et ai, 1995). 
In a pyramid structure, there are no guarantees that the controlling' 
shareholder will not abuse his power to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. The strongest control seems to be the dependence of the 
controlling shareholder on willing investors, continuing to purchase "voteless" 
shares. Where the controllers are unable to convince investors that they are 
unlikely to abuse their powers, they will not be able to attract investors at the 
right price. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter 2, corporate governance was defined as the system whereby 
companies are directed and controlled in a particular society. As previously 
stated, corporate governance deals with the agency problem of separating a 
company's ownership (shareholders) from its control (management). The 
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objectives of sound governance include providing a system or structure where 
the necessary checks and controls exist to ensure that the goals of 
management match those of the shareholders, and other stakeholders. As a 
firm's financiers represent an important group of stakeholders, the review of 
various corporate governance systems in this chapter focuses mainly on the. 
governance mechanisms that support the relationships between management 
and these entities. In this context, corporate governance deals with the 
question of how to assure financiers that they get an adequate return on their 
investment. 
From the analysis in Chapter 3, it is clear that legal protection of investors, 
together with some form of concentrated ownership, represent two essential 
~ 
components of a good corporate governance system. Large shareholders, 
sporadic concentration of owners during a takeover process and significant 
influence from banks characterise concentrated ownership. In addition, a 
combination of concentrated ownership and the legal protection of investors 
both profoundly influence the various governance systems that have been 
reviewed. 
In the US and UK, shareholders are supported through an extensive legal 
system that protects minority rights, promotes the independent selection of 
directors, allows for easy transfer of shares and which protects shareholders 
against any director's breach of fiduciary duties. Extensive bankruptcy 
protection of companies means that US creditors (including banks) have 
fewer rights than their German and Japanese counterparts and consequently, 
there is active public participation in the equities market, concentration of 
ownership via periodic takeover action or leveraged buyouts, associated with 
little bank governance. 
In Germany, creditors have stronger legal protection than they do in the US 
and UK, but fewer shareholder rights are evident. As a result, large 
shareholders and banks form powerful governance structures. Participation 
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by smaller equity investors that are more reliant on legal protection, therefore, 
is virtually non-existent. Similarly, in Japan, banks and large long-term 
shareholders (Keiretsu networks) play an important governance role and 
because of the prevalence of large, long-term investors in both Germany and 
Japan, hostile takeovers are rarely encountered. 
With holding company governance in certain European countries, Canada, 
Korea and South Africa, legal protection of investors is less significant. 
Control is concentrated in the hands of a group of minority shareholders, often 
a founding family. Insufficient laws or a failure to enforce existing laws often 
leads to legal protection being insubstantial. In general, there is less reliance 
on external financing and where external funding is to be sourced, the 
~ 
reputation of the minority controllers and their ability to generate adequate 
returns become important factors. 
A common feature of the corporate governance systems of the US and UK, 
Germany and Japan is a combination of legal protection of investors' rights 
and concentrated control, while holding company governance has 
concentrated control, but less significant investor protection. A combined 
system of legal protection and concentrated control helps to solve the agency 
problem and, as a result, ensures access to future external equity and debt 
funding. 
Following the analysis of various international governance systems in this 
chapter, the next chapter deals with corporate governance structure in South 
Africa. It will provide an overview of the extent to which the identified 
governance mechanisms exist within the South African framework. 
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4 EXISTING GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa is classified as an emerging market', and the general investors' 
perception is that corporate governance standards in emerging markets, lag 
behind those in the US, UK and continental Europe .. This is consistent with 
the outcome of the 2000 McKinsey Investors Opinion Survey, which indicated 
that investors are of the opinion that emerging markets are in greater need of 
reform than in other regions. Given South Africa's emerging market status, 
there should be a continuous focus on corporate governance reform in order 
to bring South Africa on a par with international standards. 
The South African corporate and market structure shows the characteristics of 
~ 
a control model of governance. It has already been noted that in 1999, the 
five largest groups listed on the JSE controlled more than 60% of its value 
(McGregor, 2000). This controlled environment is established via holding or 
pyramid company structures, as well as through the strong influence of family-
owned businesses. The recent trend towards unbundling, as well as changes 
to the JSE listing requirements prohibiting the listing of pyramid companies, 
may cause holding company governance to be less effective in the future. 
These changes in the governance environment, coupled with the perception 
that emerging markets' governance structures are in need of reform, stress 
the importance of constantly reviewing corporate governance in South Africa 
to improve standards. Serious corporate governance failures including those 
of Unifer, Regal Treasury Bank and LeisureNet, have also increased the 
intensity of debate surrounding corporate governance reform. 
This chapter provides an overview of the extent .to which the governance 
mechanisms, identified in Chapter 3, exist in South Africa. Each section 
focuses on the unique South African circumstances that influence the 
suitability of a governance mechanism to the South African context. It is 
furthermore the intention to identify aspects of corporate governance that can 
be incorporated in the South African framework, in order to enhance the 
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current dispensation. Chapter 5 will take this a step further and introduce the 
possibility of monitoring by large, institutional investors as an alternative form 
of governance. 
4.1 Market governance in South Africa 
In order to evaluate the functioning of market governance in South Africa, the 
components of the market governance model need .to be viewed against the 
background of the South African institutional and corporate environment. 
4.1.1 Institutional environment: shareholder structure 
Dispersed ownership is a distinct feature of the market model. In contrast to 
the wide spread shareholding of corporations in the US and UK, a significant 
number of companies listed on the JSE are tightly controlled, in the sense that 
a single shareholder coalition holds a majority of the shareholders' votes 
(refer to section 3.4.4). Control is often established via pyramid holding 
company structures in which a shareholder, or group of shareholders, can 
dilute their shareholding below the level of 50% and still maintain control over 
a majority of the votes. The large number of family-owned businesses further 
increases the level of control. 
In the market model of governance, the regulatory environment encourages 
shareholder equality and ownership generally translates into equal 
proportions of control rights (the principle of one-share-one-vote). The 
shareholders' voting rights enable them to appoint a professional team to 
manage the business on their behalf. Until recently. one-share-one-vote was 
neither enforced nor encouraged by the regulatory environment in South 
Africa. Before the amendments to the JSE listing requirements in 2002, the 
listing of a company whose main asset consisted of the controlling 
shareholding in another listed company, was not prohibited. In terms of the 
latest changes to the JSE listing requirements, pyramid companies may not 
be listed (JSE listing requirements, section 14.8), nor can shares with 
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differential voting rights. These rules, however, only apply to new listings and 
share issues and will not be forced on existing structures. The use of pyramid 
holding companies in South Africa, can result in the underlying percentage of 
shareholding being disproportionate to the voting rights. The non taxability of 
dividend flows between separate group companies in South Africa, in contrast 
to the US and UK, where such dividend flows are taxable, encourages group 
. formation. Where the regulatory system permits deviation from the one-
share-one-vote principle, it is inevitable that mechanisms such as pyramid 
companies and dual class share arrangements will be applied to create new 
share issues without sacrificing control. 
4.1.2 Institutional environment: capital market liquidity 
. 
A key component of the market governance model is an active equity market, 
including access to equity financing via public offerings. Even though the JSE 
represents a major source of external finance for South African corporations, 
its size and activity is small when compared with the London and American 
stock exchanges. In December 2001, there were 542 companies listed on the 
JSE, compared to the 2891 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
and the 7 598 companies listed on the three major American stock 
exchanges, at that time. South Africa ranked 1 ih in the world, in terms of 
market capitalisation at the end of December 2001, but 26th in terms of market 
liquidity percentage and 22nd in terms of market turnover measured in US 
dollar value. While only 11 new listings occurred on the JSE for the year 
2001, 85 delistings occurred over the same period? The trading volumes of 
shares on the JSE are significantly lower than on the bigger Anglo-American 
stock markets. Excluding arbitrage transactions, 60 billion shares were traded 
on the JSE for the year 2001, with a total value of R606 billion (£36,8 billionS). 
In comparison, the volume of shares traded on the LSE and three major 
American stock exchanges amounted to 1 803 billion and 795 billion, 
respectively. while the value of shares traded amounted to £5 581 billion and 
7 Source: JSE market profile report as at 31 December 2001 
8 Source: I-Net Bridge 26 March 2002; exchange rate: £1 = R16,45 
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$1 559 billion (£1 093 billion9) respectively. In order to access international 
capital, some of the large South African corporations also listed on 
international stock markets. Shares that were previously traded by foreign 
investors on the local stock market have now been relocated to foreign 
exchanges, thereby further decreasing the liquidity of the South African equity 
market. 
Effective market action is dependent on stock markets that will provide 
shareholders with an unrestricted and low-cost option for exiting from their 
investments when they are dissatisfied with a company's performance. 
Without well-developed, active stock markets to support quick and 
inexpensive selling of shares, shareholders lose their ability to "vote with their 
feet", utilising market action as a mechanism for disciplining management. 
Furthermore, an active takeover market forms one of the basic underlying 
principles by which the market model operates. The market for corporate 
control as a governance mechanism relies on the assumption that 
shareholders can use their votes to effect changes to a management team 
which is not operating in their best interests. The constant threat of a 
takeover provides an ongoing governance control with the objective of 
aligning management's focus with shareholder expectations. 
Given the concentrated control environment in South Africa, the threat of 
hostile takeovers can have little effect on directing management's behaviour. 
Rather than the permanent fear of being replaced by a different management 
team through a hostile takeover, the market for new share issues plays a key 
role in aligning the controllers' goals with those of the other shareholders. As 
their shares will effectively be "voteless", thereby not providing them with 
normal ownership rights, investors need to be satisfied that the controllers will 
not abuse their powers to the detriment of minority shareholders. Failing to do 
9 Source: I-Net Bridge 26 March 2002; exchange rate: $1 = £0,701 
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this, means that controlling shareholders will not be able to issue further 
shares at the price they desire. 
4.1.3 Corporate environment 
Corporate structures, like non-executive majority boards, the separation of the 
chairman and chief executive officer roles, as well as various governance 
committees, form components of the market model that aim to promote the 
independent monitoring of management. It has been noted that mechanisms 
for governing and aligning executive management's performance include 
remuneration committees and share incentive schemes. These aspects of 
corporate reform have been incorporated into the South African corporate 
governance framework, with reasonable success. The 2001 KPMG survey 
that focused mainly on areas of corporate reform consequently had 
favourable outcomes in respect of these areas. 
4.1.4 Conclusion 
It is clear that the institutional framework in South Africa tends to support a 
control model of governance. Concentrated ownership largely prevails, while 
equity markets are under-developed and illiquid, resulting in limited takeover 
action and new share issues. However, within the corporate framework of 
South Africa, corporate governance has been extensively reformed. The King 
Report (2002) encourages independence via non-executive majority boards 
as well as alignment of the board's performance with stakeholder objectives. 
It also promotes a high level of transparency and accountability. A situation 
which combines the features of a control governance model, within the 
institutional context, while market model reform is applied within the corporate 
context, is evident in South Africa. 
4.2 Bank governance in South Africa 
As explained in the previous chapter, governance arrangements in Germany 
and Japan rely more heavily on debt, or bank finance, than on equity finance. 
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In both Germany and Japan, banks maintain long-term relationships with their 
customers, or in the Japanese framework, the member firms of the Keiretsu. 
In Germany, businesses mainly turned to the banks for financing during the 
industrialisation period, while in Japan, member firms of a Keiretsu primarily 
source finance from their main bank. Through extensive levels of debt 
financing, the banks become controlling bodies and are normally well 
positioned to obtain relevant information about their customers. Banks also 
often secure board representation, thereby increasing their monitoring 
capabilities. 
The German and Japanese governance structures incorporate specific 
governance arrangements e.g. board representation and proxy voting o~ 
behalf of shareholders. Apart from these mechanisms, the basic governing 
features accompanying debt finance, stem from the nature of the debt 
contract through which the borrower obtains funds from the lender, and in 
return, undertakes to repay the lender in the future. The lender, furthermore, 
needs to adhere to certain covenants such as maintaining the value of the 
assets provided as security (collateral) for the finance. If the borrower 
defaults on a payment, or violates any covenant, the lender has certain rights, 
such as the ability to take possession of the collateral, or apply for the 
liquidation of the firm. A key feature of debt is the activation of the lender's 
control rights when a borrower fails to adhere to the debt contract (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). 
In order to assess the significance of lenders' control rights and their ability to 
invoke these in a monitoring capacity in South Africa, the extent of debt 
financing needs to be reviewed. For the purpose of this exercise, the level of 
financing provided by the six largest banks in South Africa was reviewed1o• 
Data regarding advances provided by the selected banks were obtained from 
their 2001 published annual reports. Advances include various types of 
10 Standard Bank, Nedcor, ABSA, Investec, First Rand and BOE. 
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facilities e.g. loans, overdrafts, mortgage advances, instalment sale and 
leasing accounts. Collectively, the total advances the six banks provided, 
amounted to R670 billion. Of this total, R284 billion was lent to individuals. 
The balance, R386 billion, included advances to listed and private companies, 
as well as the public sector and institutions. The total JSE market 
capitalisation of R1770,7 billion 11 represents the extent of equity financing of 
listed corporations, and far exceeded the level of debt financing. 
Even though it might vary for individual companies, this indicates that in 
general, equity represents the main source of finance for listed corporations, 
which are less dependent on debt financing. As a consequence, the potential 
for South African banks to act as monitors of corporate governance is 
restricted. 
Although banks' equity holdings are regulated, banks in Germany and Japan 
often extend their monitoring influence through share ownership of their 
customers' or member firms' equity. The Banks Act (Act No. 94 of 1990) (The 
Banks Act) regulates banks in South Africa. In terms of these regulations, 
banks are required to hold liquid assets (thereby excluding equity 
investments) matching the extent and category of their liabilities (The Banks 
Act, section 72). Investments in shares are limited to the bank's risk capital 
(The Banks Act, section 76) and the extent and type of individual investments 
are also restricted (Regulations relating to Banks, Government Gazette No. 
21726, 2000, regulation 34). The review above included an analysis of the 
extent of equity investments held by South Africa's six largest banks. It 
showed that the combined investments in listed and unlisted equities, as well 
as investments in associated companies for the selected banks amounted, on 
average, to less than 4% of total assets, and listed equities represented 
approximately 2% of these. Of the six banks, Standard Bank had the highest 
monetary investment value, R23,5 billion, of which R18 billion related to listed 
11 Source: JSE market profile report 
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equities, translating to 1 % of the market capitalisation of the JSE. Standard 
Bank's R18 billion investment portfolio, furthermore, includes a large number 
of different equities. These low levels of equity holdings indicate that the 
potential of banks to extend their monitoring influence via equity holdings is 
fairly restricted in this country. 
In Germany, proxy voting has a far greater monitoring impact than direct 
equity holdings. Through exercising voting rights, banks can exert major 
influence over the composition of executive bodies and boards of directors, 
but in South Africa, this type of proxy voting is not common. Banks, however, 
do act as nominee companies, providing a facility allowing investors to 
register their shares in the name of that nominee company. However, the 
~ 
service provided by the nominee companies is limited to certain administrative 
functions e.g. administration of share certificates and excludes voting on an 
investor's behalf, or providing guidance in respect of voting issues. 
It can be concluded from this review, that the role of South African banks in 
monitoring corporate governance is limited and the level of debt financing, in 
general, is lower than the extent of equity financing. Unlike the banks in 
Germany and Japan, which increase their ability to monitor by way of both 
equity holdings and proxy voting, South African banks do not have significant 
equity holdings nor do they act as proxy voters. 
4.3 Other features of the German and Japanese governance systems 
In addition to bank monitoring, there are a number of other features of the 
German and Japanese systems, identified in Chapter 3, which are relevant 
within the South African corporate governance framework. 
4.3.1 Two-tier board structure 
Chapter 3 outlined that the purpose of the two-tier board system is to provide 
a committee of shareholders and employees the power and authority to 
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supervise management. This means that the objectives of the supervisory 
board are to ensure that management's interests are aligned with those of the 
stakeholders. 
As already noted, there has been significant progress towards reforming 
corporate governance in South Africa, particularly in respect of the 
independence and performance of corporate boards, as well as transparency 
and accountability to shareholders (section 4.1.3, above). The process of 
reforming the composition and functioning of boards that South African 
corporations have adopted seems to follow the market model standards. 
Given investors' preference for the principles of the market governance 
model, the implementation of the two-tier board concept would, therefore, no! 
generally be viewed as an enhancement of corporate governance standards. 
4.3.2 Mutual monitoring 
In Japan, the mutual monitoring between members of a Keiretsu group is 
established via the extensive web of trade relationships and equity holdings, 
and is coupled with the 'frequent trading between partners in the group, w~lich 
provides a base for the continuous flow of information necessary for 
monitoring performance. Mutual monitoring serves as a governance 
mechanism in the sense that it constantly threatens management with 
demotion or replacement. 
A similar form of monitoring can be found in the large South African group 
corporations, where the holding or parent company and its various 
subsidiaries have a comparable relationship. The controlling shareholder 
normally plays a key role in appointing management teams and in monitoring 
the performance and strategy of the subsidiary companies. In group 
companies, the holding company directors are often members of the boards 
of subsidiary companies, thereby enhancing the flow of information, up the 
pyramid, to the holding company. The various governance committees of the 
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subsidiaries, e.g. the audit and remuneration committees, can often include 
holding company representation. 
Although in a different format, the objective of mutual monitoring is achieved 
within the group corporations in South Africa. 
4.4 Holding company governance in South Africa 
Chapter 3 provided an analysis of the holding company governance in the 
South African context. The effectiveness of holding company governance is 
illustrated by Barr, et al (1995) who found that large conglomerates increased 
shareholder wealth by creating value in excess of the value of the listed, 
individual holdings of the members of the same group. 
However, a number of significant unbundling transactions have taken place in 
South Africa over the past couple of years. Examples include Rembrandt, 
which scrapped its pyramid structure and listed as two separate entities, 
VenFin (technology interests) and Remgro (mining, financial and industrial 
investments), De Beers which unbundled its 35% stake in Anglo American 
and Pepkor's split into three listed entities after unbundling and delisting its 
holding company, Pepgro. Further unbundlings included Tiger Brands' stake 
in Astral Foods (its agri-poultry business), Johncom's stake in M-Cell and 
Iscor's unbundling to separately list its mining operations. This trend supports 
the transformation of the controlled shareholder environment, as established 
via pyramid holding company structures, into a more widely dispersed 
ownership structure, congruent with market model principles. The changes in 
the requirements for listing on the JSE are further steps towards reforming the 
current shareholder control environment in South Africa. 
Even though the South African shareholder environment is still predominantly 
a controlled one, it seems to be shifting towards a wider distribution of 
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ownership rights. An outcome of this trend is the reduced impact of holding 
company governance in the South African corporate governance framework. 
4.5 The enhancement of the South African governance system 
This section examines whether certain aspects of the governance systems 
previously identified can be incorporated into the existing South African 
framework in order to enhance the standard and quality of corporate 
governance. 
4.5.1 Market governance reform 
Similar to many emerging market economies, a South African priority is 
attracting international equity investment. As the market model of governance 
is a key feature of Anglo-American corporations, investors generally feel 
assured by this governance structure. The alignment of corporate 
governance standards and structures with international norms is necessary 
for South Africa to become a global player and as a result, corporate reform 
naturally tends towards the market model (McKinsey, 2001). 
The developments in corporate governance in South Africa do, in fact, fit with 
this trend towards transforming the current dispensation into a market model 
orientated governance system and has been assisted by the regulatory 
changes implemented during recent years. Reference has already been 
made to the changes to both the Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973) and the 
JSE's listing requirements. The corporate governance guidelines for South 
Africa, the King Report (1994) and the second King Report (2002), further set 
the tone and principles for sound governance. The .King Report (2002) mainly 
addresses the internal governing of corporations, specifically boards of 
directors, auditing and accounting policies and procedures, internal audit, risk 
management, as well as certain non-financial· matters including 
communication with stakeholders. 
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It is important to note that the corporate governance system of a country not 
only consists of the internal guidelines for governing corporations, but that 
institutional structures, including the shareholder environment and market 
structure (liquidity and level of development), also cornprise a significant 
component of a country's governance system. It is in these areas that South 
Africa's ruling governance structures differ most from the market governance 
model. Unfortunately, these aspects playa major role in promoting investors' 
confidence. Over half of the respondents in McKinsey's 2001 Emerging 
Market Survey rated institutional and corporate form as equally important, 
because they perceive that institutional reform provides a greater level of 
security for their investments. The institutional aspects that McKinsey 
considered in its survey also included the enforceability of legal rights, macro-
~ 
economic stability, as well as the accuracy, timeliness and coverage of 
financial accounts. 
Some of the regulatory changes in South Africa are designed to address 
institutional reform. The changes to the JSE listing requirements, prohibiting 
both the listing of new pyramid companies and the issue of shares with 
differential voting rights, are steps towards relaxing the prevailing control 
structures. However, as the regulatory changes are not retrospective, it 
remains a challenge to encourage corporations with existing control structures 
to reform the shareholder environment. The recent drive by the Accounting 
Practices Board to align South African Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice (SA GAAP) with international standards, as well as the aspects of the 
King Report (2002) addressing communication with, and reporting to 
stakeholders, can also be viewed as improvements to the institutional 
environment. The King Report (2002) has also recommended that there be 
legal backing for accounting standards. The revised JSE listing requirements 
also stipulate that all listed companies should prepare their annual financial 
statements in compliance with GAAP standards. The JSE listing 
requirements, in general, are intended to promote international investor 
confidence and increase the quality of information available to investors. 
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The greatest barrier to market model reform .in South Africa remains the 
illiquid and underdeveloped equity market, when compared with Anglo-
American markets. In this context, certain conditions of the amended JSE 
listing requirements impose further constraints on accessing capital. In the 
past, companies had to have a pre-tax profit history of R1 million, subscribed 
capital of R2 million and 300 public shareholders (10% shareholder spread). 
However, following the amendments, they must have a pre-tax profit history of 
R8 million, subscribed capital of R25 million and 500 public shareholders 
(20% shareholder spread). 
In terms of the governing of corporations, the King Report (2002) guidelines 
. 
reflect the market model. Given the structural support of a sound code of 
corporate governance, the acceptance and implementation of these 
guidelines by the business community must be the next area of focus. 
4.5.2 Bank or debt governance reform 
Section 4.2 provided a review of the potential monitoring capabilities of banks 
in South Africa and included an examination of the extent of debt financing 
provided by banks, their level of equity holdings, as well as their role in proxy 
voting. This revealed that equity financing represents a more significant 
source of funding than bank debt financing for listed companies, and that 
banks' equity holdings are limited, nor do they act as proxy voters on behalf of 
shareholders. 
As a result, the potential of South African banks to act as monitors, as is the 
case in Germany or Japan, is limited. The possibility of this role for South 
African banks has, furthermore, been reduced by the recent failures in the 
banking industry (Saambou Bank, Regal Treasury Bank, Unifer), outlined in 
the introduction to this study_ 
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However, the six largest banks in South Africa do collectively provide various 
forms of debt financing, which amounts to approximately R390 billion, to listed 
and private corporations, the public sector and other institutions. The 
potential for banks to contribute to an improved corporate governance 
environment, in this country, should therefore not be disregarded. 
4.5.3 Holding company governance reform· 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that migration towards a market 
model of governance would improve investors' confidence and improve the 
overall standard of governance in South Africa. In addition, the trend in South 
Africa also seems to reflect reform that will shift governance towards the 
market model of corporate governance. Movement away from a control 
, 
shareholder environment is evident from the unbundling transactions, already 
mentioned, as well as the changes to the JSE listing requirements. The King 
Report (2002) further endorses governance principles that fit the market 
model standards. While holding company governance, which has played a 
key role in the company governance in the past, will continue to do so for as 
long as company control structures are in place, it is evident that the trend of· 
reform will be towards the market model, Consequently holding company 
governance will playa less significant role in the South African framework of 
the future. 
4.5.4 The need for alternatives 
When viewing the structural framework of corporate governance in South 
Africa, it would appear that the King Report (2002), the JSE rules and 
regulations and the Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973) have laid the foundation 
for corporate governance reform that complies with international market 
model standards. The acceptance and implementation of these guidelines 
and regulations is an evolving process that will, over time, enhance the overall 
quality of corporate governance in South Africa. 
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The reality that needs to be addressed, is a shareholder environment that is 
still largely control dominated, as well as illiquid and underdeveloped equity 
markets, in terms of Anglo-American standards. The significant corporate 
governance failures of Saambou Bank, Unifer, Regal Treasury Bank and 
LeisureNet, which have severely dented the image of corporate governance in 
South Africa, further illustrate that the appropriate guidelines and standards 
have not been satisfactorily incorporated into the corporate governance 
framework. 
South Africa finds itself in a unique transitory situation where the rules and 
guidelines have been formulated in a market model context, but where the 
institutional framework (control shareholder environment; illiquid and 
~ 
underdeveloped equity markets) fails to support full transformation into a 
market model dispensation. Given these circumstances, the current 
governance system can only benefit from embracing alternative forms of 
monitoring that will bring South Africa closer to its goal of meeting 
international standards for corporate governance. 
A mechanism that has been successfully applied in the US to improve the 
level of governance is monitoring by large institutional investors. II') the next 
chapter, the possibility of using a similar mechanism will be proposed as an 
alternative form of corporate governance in South Africa. 
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5 A NEW PERSPECTIVE: MONITORING BY LARGE INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS 
Institutional investors, for example in the US and UK, collectively hold large 
stakes of the US and UK equity markets. Given the collective size of these 
holdings, they control a significant portion of the equity market. Through 
exercising the ownership rights linked to their portfolios, institutional investors 
have the potential to playa key monitoring role, thus influencing the quality of 
governance of the companies in which they invest. 
This view is shared by various corporate governance reports (Cad bury, 1992, 
Hampel, 1998, King, 2002) that contain recommendations pertaining, 
~ 
specifically, to institutional investors. These recommendations advocate 
greater involvement by large institutional investors and aim to encourage 
them to accept the ownership responsibilities implied by their shareholding. 
5.1 Recommendations by corporate governance codes concerning 
institutional investors 
The Cadbury committee incorporated, into its report, the following 
recommendations from the Institutional Shareholders' Committee in the UK, 
that: 
• institutional investors should encourage regular, systematic contact at 
senior executive level to exchange views and information on strategy, 
performance, board membership and management quality; 
• institutional investors should make positive use of their voting rights; and 
• institutional investors should take a positive interest in the composition of 
boards of directors (Cadbury Report, 1992: 50). 
The Hampel Report on Corporate Governance (1998:.41 - 45) includes the 
following principles of good corporate governance pertaining to shareholders: 
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• Shareholder voting: Institutional shareholders should adopt a considered 
policy on voting the shares that they control; 
• Dialogue between companies and investors: Companies and institutional 
shareholders should each be ready, where practicable, to enter into a 
dialogue based on the mutual understanding of objectives; 
• Evaluation of governance disclosures: When evaluating companies' 
governance arrangements, particularly those relating to board structure 
and composition, institutional investors and their advisers should give due 
weight to all relevant factors drawn to their attention; 
• The annual general meeting (AGM): Companies should use the AGM to 
communicate with private investors and encourage their participation. 
The King Report (2002: 149 -151) includes the following guidelines pertaining 
to institutional investors: 
• Institutional investors have an obligation to their policy holders, etc., to 
ensure that the underlying investments are achieving their full potential 
through applying effective corporate governance practices; 
• Sanctions should be visited upon directors and the management of 
companies, notably institutional shareholders, who fail to attend 
shareholders' meetings; 
• Institutional bodies, of which the investors are members, are to apply 
pressure to ensure that appropriate involvement is achieved. 
These recommendations of increased institutional investors' involvement aim 
to enhance the overall standard and quality of a country's corporate 
governance system. They also underline the potential for institutional 
investors to become successful monitors, thereby improving the existing 
governance framework. 
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5.2 Monitoring mechanisms 
. The most common and accessible forms of monitoring available to 
institutional shareholders remain their right and power to vote as shareholders 
at the Annual General Meeting. While this is the most obvious way for 
institutions to exercise their power over a company's management, there are 
a number of other courses of action available to them, in their capacity as 
relatively large shareholders, and these are dealt with below: 
5.2.1 Refusal to participate in rights issues 
One course of action available is that an institution can refuse to participate in 
rights issues when companies attempt to raise additional equity financing on 
the market (Keasey,et ai, 1997: 39). As companies are largely dependent on 
institutions to support them in a rights issue, this refusal provides institutions 
with a level of power in these circumstances. Institutions can, for example, 
make their acceptance of the rights issue conditional on certain governance 
changes e.g. board replacements. 
5.2.2 Adverse public comment 
The ability of institutions to make negative public announcements about the 
firms they invest in poses a constal1t threat to the management of those 
companies (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 39). However, the problem arises that such 
announcements might· damage the share price and reputation of these 
companies, thereby negatively affecting institutional investments. Such 
negative publicity can also discourage further information flow from 
management to the institutions, thereby hampering future monitoring 
potential. 
5.2.3 Removal of directors via a general meeting 
In addition, institutional shareholders can act to replace a company's directors 
at a general meeting. However, this course of action could be detrimental to a 
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company's share value and reputation. with conseql.Jences similar to those of 
negative public announcements. 
5.2.4 Threat of selling a company's shares 
A threat to sell shares in a firm represents a mechanism that need not 
necessarily be exercised publicly, as with the actions mentioned above. Such 
a threat may, however, adversely affect the investments of other institutions, 
resulting in potential criticism or retaliatory action (Keasey, et ai, 1997: 40) 
5.2.5 Developing long-term relationships 
A feature of corporate governance that could be incorporated from the 
Japanese system is longer-term interaction between institutions and a firm's 
~ 
board and management. Such a strategy could provide a means for 
institutional shareholders for improving their monitoring capability, but is 
dependent on the co-operation of management and could imply a substantial 
investment of time and money. 
5.3 Intervention by institutional shareholders: empirical evidence 
There are a number of studies designed to obtain empirical evidence about 
the relationships between shareholder intervention and a firm's performance. 
Smith (1996) analysed the effects of institutional shareholder activism on 
shareholder wealth and operating performance. His empirical study was 
based on the 51 firms targeted by the California Public Employees' 
Retirement System (CaIPERS)12 over the period 1987 to 1993. Smith found 
that shareholder wealth increased for firms that adopted the changes 
proposed by, or made changes resulting in a settlement with, CalPERS (who 
acted as intervening institution), while shareholder wealth decreased for firms 
which resisted changes. However, there was no statistically significant 
12 CalPERS represents a large institution that attempts to increase their portfolio returns 
through governance-related activities. For documented cases refer to Fulman (1998), 
Hemmerick (1997) and Springsteel (1998). 
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change in operating performance for the firms that did implement the 
CalPERS suggestions. Nesbitt (1994) comes to the same conclusion 
regarding stock price' performance for a sample offirms targeted by CaIPERS. 
According to Nesbitt, slJccessful intervention by CalPERS had a long-term 
favourable effect on the selected firms' share prices. 
These results indicate that there are potential benefits that can result from 
active intervention by institutional investors in the governance of companies, 
in terms of increased share price performance. 
5.4 Potential difficulties arising from intervention by institutional 
shareholders 
A number of aspects can influence an institutional shareholder's decision to 
actively monitor their investments, as outlined below. 
5.4.1 Indexed matching or passive investment by institutions 
Impediments to more active intervention by institutional investors include the 
need to diversify, as well as the growth of indexing (whereby investors own a 
basket of shares selected to reflect the performance of an index, which 
represents the market or a sector of the market). With indexed matching; 
fund managers are usually driven by their portfolio's investment performance 
against the selected index. This can lead to managers taking a short-term 
approach to the shares in their portfolios. In terms of this approach, non-
performing shares are sold, instead of being retained while incurring costly 
intervention actions to improve long-term share value, thereby decreasing the 
return of the portfoliO. 
5.4.2 The costs of monitoring 
Intervention by institutional investors necessitates a Significant investment of 
time and costs, because the process of gathering information, as well as 
monitoring management may be highly technical in nature and therefore 
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require a relatively high level of expertise and involvement. Free-riding 
imposes a further problem for the intervening institution as its effort will also 
be to the benefit of all the other investors. ColleCtive action, therefore, by a 
group of institutions provides a solution to the free-riding problem. 
5.4.3 Risks of trading 
A close relationship between an institutional investor, the board and 
management of a firm, implies a reasonably extensive level of information 
exchange. In this way, the institution becomes party to such information that 
trading of its stake might result in accusations of insider trading. 
It is evident, therefore, that institutional shareholders face a number of 
~ 
difficulties when actively participating in the governance of the firms included 
in their investment portfolios. 
5.5 Monitoring by institutional investors as a proposition for South 
Africa 
Institutional investors' current role in governance, coupled with levels of 
shareholding in the market, will influence their potential for monitoring 
corporate governance in South Africa. 
The various vehicles for long-term savings e.g. insurance or pension funds 
have a strong presence in the South African economy and is largely the 
historical result of savings flows into such funds rather than into banks. 
During the high inflation period of the 1970s, pension and retirement funds 
preferred investments in equities over bonds or cash investments. Changes 
in the 1980s, meant that public sector pension funds were no longer restricted 
in terms of their equity investments, resulting in further "Hows to the equity 
market (Kantor, 1998). This shift to equities was also motivated by the 
returns, well above the inflation rate, achieved in the equity market during that 
period. 
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The South African tax legislation is also more favourable for savings via 
pension or retirement vehicles than bank or unit trust investments. 
Contributions to pension funds and retirement annuities are tax deductible for 
personal and company tax purposes (employee and e"mployer contributions). 
However, funds deposited with banks, or unit trust investments are not tax 
deductible. Furthermore, until 1996, pension and retirement funds were not 
liable for tax, thereby stimulating personal savings through these vehicles. 
The taxability of interest, versus the tax exempt status of dividend "income, 
creates a further disincentive for cash investments. Secondary Tax on 
Companies (STC), based on all dividends declared by a company, currently 
charged at a rate of 12,5%, was introduced in 1993, in conjunction with a 
reduction in the company tax rate. The intention of STC was to encourage 
companies to adopt a modest dividend distribution policy while reinvesting 
funds in the corporation. It should therefore not be seen as a withholding tax 
on shareholders. 
Historically, exchange control regulation also contributed to the high savings 
110w into the pension and retirement industry. In the past, strict exchange 
control regulations limited international investment options for South African 
investors and as a result, stimulated flows into domestic equities via pension 
and retirement fund vehicles. Although exchange control regulations have 
been relaxed significantly, there are still restrictions pertaining to the level of 
foreign investments for both institutions and individuals. 
For these reasons, the South African insurance companies enjoy a significant 
share of the long-term savings product market, and also manage a number of 
retirement funds. According to Kantor (1998), long-term savings vehicles 
owned up to 90% of the value of the JSE-listed shares. In addition to the 
policyholders' funds invested in the equity market, the demutualisation of two 
of the largest life insurance companies in South Africa (San lam during 1998 
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and Old Mutual during 1999), brought a further investment of their 
shareholders' funds into the equity market. 
It should also be noted that due to the limited equity investment opportunities 
in South Africa and the relatively illiquid stock market, institutional investors 
are often locked into their investments. This forces the institutional investor to 
take a longer-term view of its investment, and consequently involve itself in 
the governing of that particular company. 
It is evident that the South African life insurance companies, through 
investments of their policyholders' and shareholders' funds, and through 
management of a number of pension funds, exercise control over significant 
~ 
portions of the equity market. However, the reality is that the life insurance 
companies appoint professional asset managers to manage the various 
portfolios of funds according to specific investment mandates, whose 
mandates often include different levels of index matching, with the 
performance of portfolios measured against these indices. The problems 
relating to institutional intervention, as outlined in section 5.4, are therefore 
equally apposite for the South African institutional investor. 
A conflict of interest arises for portfolio managers; as investors, they need to 
decrease the risk of their portfolios, while optimising portfolio returns. 
However, in their capacity as shareholders they need to exercise their 
ownership rights, including the right to vote on issues that affect the governing 
of the firms in which they hold shares. 
5.6 Conclusion 
South African life insurance companies claimed significant stakes of individual 
investors' savings flows via long-term savings vehicles, as a result of the 
historical economic climate and the taxation dispensation. Through investing 
their policy- and shareholders' funds, as well as by managing various pension 
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funds, the life insurance companies own significant portions of the JSE. 
Given the relatively illiquid and inactive state of the equity market, as well as 
limitations on foreign investment opportunities, institutional investors are often 
effectively locked into certain investments, with the result that South African 
institutional investors, especially the large life insurance companies and 
pension fund administrators, can potentially playa significant monitoring role 
in the corporate governance framework. 
However, there are deterrents to this type of institutional intervention, among 
which are the costs of monitoring by individual institutions and the absence of 
structures to stimulate co-ordinated intervention by institutional shareholders. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
This dissertation aims to identify alternative or improved corporate 
governance mechanisms that could be incorporated into the current South 
African governance structure in order to enhance the current dispensation. 
For this purpose, various international corporate governance models were 
analysed. For each model, monitoring mechanisms that restrict 
management's ability to abuse its power and promote management 
accountability to stakeholders, were identified. 
The market model found in the US and UK, is characterised by widespread 
~ 
shareholding, a regulatory environment that promotes shareholder equality 
(the principle of one-share-one-vote), as well as active and liquid capital 
markets. As a result, the monitoring mechanisms tend to be market 
orientated. The effective and liquid external market for equity provides 
shareholders with an unrestricted and low-cost option to offload their 
investment when they are dissatisfied with a company's performance, thereby 
voting with their feet for a change in management's actions. Shareholders' 
ability to vote on takeover bids and thereby affecting change in managerial 
control represents a further significant check on managerial behaviour. 
In South Africa, a controlled shareholder environment as well as inactive and 
illiquid equity markets when compared with the Anglo-American standards are 
evident. These features prevent the market model mechanisms from playing 
a greater monitoring role in the South African governance framework. Market 
model reform in this institutional context will necessitate regulatory and 
structural changes, thus addressing the restrictive shareholder environment 
and the status of the equities market. It is unlikely that the influence of market 
model monitoring mechanisms will increase until such changes are effected. 
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Further market model mechanisms aimed at promoting the independent 
monitoring of management include corporate structures such as non-
executive majority boards, separation of the chairman and chief executive 
officer roles as well as the existence of various governance committees. 
Extensive reform in these areas has' already been incorporated into the South 
African corporate governance framework over the last decade. Examples of 
such reform include the 1994 and 2002 King Reports, as well as changes to 
the Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973) and the Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990), 
designed to improve the level of corporate governance. Notwithstanding 
these measures, a number of significant corporate failures occurred during 
this period. Enforcement and acceptance of the guidelines provided by the 
King Reports seem to be imperative. 
The German and Japanese bank governance model relies more heavily on 
debt financing than on equity finanCing. Through extensive levels of debt 
financing, the banks become controlling bodies, often increasing their 
monitoring capacity by securing positions on their customers' boards. They 
also often hold their customers' equity. In Germany, proxy voting further 
extends the banks' influence over the composition of corporate boards and 
executive bodies. 
In South Africa th~ level of bank debt financing is generally lower than equity 
financing, thereby limiting banks' ability to become monitors through their debt 
control rights. Banks neither have signi'ficant equity holdings, nor act as proxy 
voters on behalf of shareholders. The potential for reform in South Africa by 
way of increased bank monitoring is therefore restricted. The image of banks 
as potential monitors was furthermore tarnished by recent corporate failures in 
the banking industry. 
The German and Japanese governance models feature further monitoring 
mechanisms, such as two-tier boards structures (Germany) and mutual 
monitoring among Keiretsu members (Japan). With the support of regulations 
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and guidelines like those contained in the King Reports, certain sections of 
the Companies Act (No. 61 of 1973) and JSE listing requirements, board 
reform in South Africa reflects the principles of the market model and 
consequently, implementing a two-tier board structure.would not be viewed as 
an enhancement of South African· corporate governance enhancement. In 
Japan, mutual monitoring between members of a Keiretsu group is 
established via the extensive web of trade relationships and equity holdings 
within the group. Within the large South African group corporations where the 
holding or parent company and their various subsidiaries have a comparable 
relationship and similar structure, the objectives of mutual monitoring are 
achieved. 
With holding company governance in certain European countries, Canada, 
Korea, and South Africa, control is concentrated in the hands of a group of 
minority shareholders, often the family that founded the business. The 
controlling shareholder strongly influences the appointment of management 
teams, boards of directors and the company strategy, thereby acting as 
monitors. The reputations of minority controllers, as well as their ability to 
generate adequate shareholder returns, play an important role in raising 
additional equity funding. 
Even though studies have illustrated the effectiveness of holding company 
governance in South Africa (Barr, et ai, 1995), a number of factors have 
caused its impact to wane. The recent, significant unbundling transactions, as 
well as amendments to the JSE listing requirements to prohibit the listing of 
pyramid companies, all support transformation of a controlled shareholder 
environment into a wider, dispersed ownership structure. The trend of reform 
addresses transformation of the shareholder environment, and reflects market 
model principles. 
In order for South Africa to attract capital globally, the perceived level of 
governance needs to comply with international standards. The shift towards 
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market model standards is natural, as investors generally tend to feel more 
assured by the governance structures applied in the Anglo-American 
corporations. Regulatory reform in South Africa, over the last decade, has 
supported transformation into a market model dispensation. However, the 
continued existence of an institutional framework (control shareholder 
environment, illiquid and underdeveloped equity markets) that fails to support 
total reform to the market model, remains a reality that must be addressed. 
Given these circumstances, the current governance system can only benefit 
from incorporating alternative forms of monitoring that can help South Africa 
to comply with international standards. 
Monitoring by large institutional investors has improved the level of 
governance in the US. South Africa's economic history, coupled with the 
taxation dispensation, has contributed to a strong institutional shareholder 
environment, dominated by large insurance companies and pension funds. 
Furthermore, the relatively illiquid and inactive state of the equity market, 
together with limitations on foreign investment opportunities, mean that 
institutional investors are largely locked into their investments. In this 
environment, it is proposed that institutional investors in South Africa should 
playa more significant monitoring role in corporate governance, by becoming 
active shareholders and by assuming the ownership responsibilities inherent 
in the shares under their control. In addition, the development of structures to 
co-ordinate intervention can be stimulated and would significantly enhance 
monitoring activities. 
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